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Faith […] refers to the firm conviction (abhisampratyaya), the serene 
acceptance (prasāda) 3  of the mind, the [sincere] aspiration (abhilāṣa) 
[directed] at the [law of] act (karman) and fruition (phala), the [four Noble] 
Truths (satya), and the [three] Jewels (ratna).  
1 I have nothing against New Age approaches and re-interpretations of Buddhist philosophy in a 
modern key. On the contrary! I think they should be as bold and creative as they choose to be. Such 
creativity is not only in tune with the paradigm of our times but also helps Buddhism develop as a 
living system of ideas and practices. What I feel rather objectionable is that (quite?) a few modernising 
approaches present themselves as faithful reflections of the traditional Buddhist doctrines and 
practices. Boldness should, I believe, be also directed at the admission that our modern adaptations, 
or at least part of them, may depart from the historically attested corpus of teachings and praxis.   
2 For Sthiramati’s dating, see Deleanu 2019, 19-22.  
3 Skt. prasāda can also be translated as ‘clear acceptance’. 
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Much has been said and written on the subject of rebirth and karma by traditional 
Buddhist preachers and scholars as well as by modern researchers. The following pages 
do not claim to bring any substantial contribution. In line with the editorial policy of this 
journal, I have just strung together some research notes made over the years. They are far 
from comprehensive, and the bibliographical material is minimum. If there is anything 
remotely deserving the name of ‘contribution’, then this is Section 3.2. (at least some 
parts of it) dedicated to the rebirth proofs adduced by Āryaśūra in the Brahmajātaka.  
Apart of an overview of the topic, I also hope that these pages can help remind us 
that rebirth (automatically associated by the tradition with the law of karma) is a key tenet 
of utmost importance for pre-modern Buddhists. This is all too obvious for anyone 
familiar with the canonical sources and history of Buddhism. It appears, however, to be 
conveniently skipped over in many New Age discourses and presentations watered down 
to suit our Zeitgeist.1 Compared to other palatable doctrines, rebirth is indeed a topic hard 
to pitch to modern audiences. Yet, it arguably is as central as the belief in God in the 
Abrahamic religions.  
The following passage from the Triṃśikāvijñaptibhāṣya (Commentary on the 
Demonstration of Representation-only in Thirty Stanzas) by Sthiramati (c. 480-550) 





(śraddhā […] karmaphalasatyaratneṣv abhisampratyayaḥ prasādaś 
cetaso ’bhilāṣaḥ. Triṃśikāvijñaptibhāṣya 76.6-7).  
 
Admittedly, Sthiramati is a representative Yogācāra-Vijñānavāda thinker, but his 
definition transcends narrow doctrinal borders between the Śrāvakayāna and Mahāyāna. 
There are quite a few common concepts and motifs running throughout the entire 
Buddhist history, but unfortunately, the tradition has left nothing approximating the 
Nicene Creed. If history had been different, and a common statement of belief had been 
adopted by a unified Buddhist Synod, I venture to surmise that the three pillars of faith 
outlined by Sthiramati would have been included.  
* 
The following notes have been arranged under three headings: beliefs, models (or 
mechanisms), and proofs. They answer three of basic questions which any serious 
philosophical tradition has to answer: ‘what’ (statements and definitions), ‘how’ 
(mechanisms and relations between ideas), and ‘why’ (proofs and criteria for the 
arguments made). These questions/answers also represent degrees of philosophical 
refinement. It is easier to state an idea than to describe its functioning. And it is less 
challenging to provide a functional mechanism than to prove its veracity. Indeed one can 
speak of a mature philosophical system only when a coherent edifice of demonstration 
and argumentation has been perfected. In this sense, Buddhism has reached its maturity.    
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1. Beliefs: Wandering from one life to another 
 
1.1. Origins of the rebirth belief  
The origins of the rebirth-cum-karma paradigms in Buddhism, Jainism, and Hinduism 
remain obscure and controversial. Prestigious Vedic scholars like Toshifumi Gotō (2009) 
and Junko Sakamoto-Gotō (2015), for example, stress the continuity of the Vedic beliefs 
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in afterlife into the Buddhist model of rebirth. The latter, however, is not to be found as 
such in early Vedic literature. Aptly capturing the priorities of the Vedic model, Wendy 
Doniger O’Flaherty remarks that ‘[t]he theory of rebirth does not appear in the Vedas; but 
the theory of re-death appears at a very early stage indeed’ (1983 [1980], 3).  
On the other hand, equally prestigious Indologists like Johannes Bronkhorst (2007, 
73ff.) stress the non-Brahmanic origin of the rebirth-cum-karma model whose roots go to 
the religious traditions of the śramaṇas or ‘ascetics’ in the so-called Greater Magadha 
region, i.e. the lower plains of the Ganges. These traditions or elements originating in 
them were gradually absorbed into the Brahmanic system. The process begins with the 
Bṛhadāraṇyaka, Chāndogya, and Kauṣītaki Upaniṣads, texts in which the Magadhian 
ideas still feel like a ‘foreign intrusion into the Vedic tradition’ (ibid. 120).  
A different twist to the latter scenario is argued by the New Zealander scholar 
Jayarava Attwood (2012, 53-55), based on the insights offered by the German Indologist 
Michael Witzel (2010). According to their hypothesis, the idea of karma and an ethicised 
view of the afterlife was among the Iranian elements brought by the Śākyas, ethnic 
group(s) of Scythian origin. ‘This [idea of deeds being weighed after death] was first an 
Egyptian, then a Zoroastrian and Iranian concept. It is connected with the idea of personal 
responsibility for one’s actions (karma)’ (Witzel 2010; Attwood 2012, 53).      
The problem is far too complex, and my competence much too limited, but suffice 
it to cautiously say that the two perspectives may not be irreconcilable. It is conceivable 
that the earlier Vedic beliefs in afterlife prepared the ground for the adoption of the 
Magadhian elements, some of which may have originated in Iranian religious imports. 
This led to the crystallisation of a proto-rebirth-cum-karma paradigm which was 
developed and interpreted in unique ways by each major religious and philosophical 
tradition. It is this ethicised view of afterlife which will become the dominant model on 
the Indian subcontinent from the last centuries of the 1st millennium BCE on.   
  
1.2. Rebirth in the Early Canon4 
Whatever its origin may be, the idea of a cycle of rebirths or, more literally, ‘wandering’ 
(saṃsāra) from one life to another, is accepted as a matter of fact from the earliest strata 
of the Buddhist Canon. Let us look at a few verses from the Suttanipāta (Collection of 
                                                 
4 For more thorough analyses of the concepts of rebirth (as well as kamma/karman), see McDermott 
1983 [1980]; McDermott 1984; Nakamura 1993, vol. I, 811-826, 971-987; Nakamura 1994, vol. II, 





Discourses),5 believed to be one of the oldest Buddhist texts (if not the earliest).6  
 
Having examined all mental constructions,7  
[as well as] the cycle of rebirths [and the sentient beings in their]  
passing away [from on life] and birth [into another],  
Being free from stain and blemish, pure,  
having attained the destruction of births – him they call ‘awakened’.8  
                                                 
5 All renderings below are mine. It goes without saying that earlier translations, many coming from 
the pens of prestigious Buddhist scholars, have been an important source of inspiration (though at 
times I beg to differ in my readings). The most problematic terms will be discussed in the footnotes, 
where I shall also mention equivalents and interpretations found in other translations.  
6 See Nakamura 1984, 435; Nakamura 1989 [1980], 27; Nakamura 1993, vol. I, p. IV; Nakamura 
1992, 573-732 (a large appendix dedicated to the philological, historical, and cultural criteria for 
determining the formation history of the early Buddhist Canon; it also contains numerous references 
to the antiquity of the Suttanipāta). According to Nakamura, there is a chronological difference in the 
formation of the various parts of the Suttanipāta, with the Pārāyanavagga being the earliest one 
(actually the very first text in the entire Canon; see Nakamura 1989 [1980], 27). Similarly, von Hinüber 
1997 [1996], 49, points out that the last two Vaggas, Aṭṭhakavagga and Pārāyanavagga, ‘seem to be 
very old texts.’ (None of the three examples below come, however, from the earliest strata of the text.)     
7 The exact meaning of kappa (Skt. kalpa) here is difficult to ascertain. Fausböll trans. 1898, 88, 
translates kappāni […] kevalāni as ‘all times (kappa)’. Similarly, Nakamura trans. 1984, 110, renders 
‘all cosmic aeons’ あらゆる宇宙時期  while Aramaki, Honjō, and Enomoto trans. 2015, 132, 
translate as ‘processes of the formation and destruction of the Universe’ 宇宙の生成・消滅過程, 
obviously spelling out the meaning of kappa/kalpa as a cosmic time unit. This is a possibility which 
cannot be ruled out especially as the ascetic referred to in this verse examines not only kappāni but 
also the cycle of rebirths and the living beings as the die and are reborn. The latter covers a huge range 
in space and time, and kappāni in the sense of ‘aeons’ may have simply reinforced the idea of 
contemplating saṃsāra (and the accompanying dukkha) in its infinity. Without excluding this reading, 
I give, however, precedence to Norman’s (2001 65) line of interpretation which is based on the gloss 
of kappāni in the traditional commentary (see Sn-a II 426.22-23). The latter takes kappa in its sense 
of ‘imagination’. Norman 2001, 65, renders the word as ‘figments’. This interpretative line implies 
that the ascetic examines the cycle of rebirths as well as the mental constructions (kappāni) which 
becloud our minds and make this wandering go on forever.     
8 ‘Him or her – they call “awakened”’, I should hastily add and perhaps translate. In Pali, the personal 
pronoun taṃ is the accusative form for both genders. It makes, however, the translation too modern –
at least for my admittedly old-fashioned stylistic tastes. The use of ‘him/her’ in the translation of a 
2400-2300 years’ old work would take away much of the archaic poetical charm. Actually, in most of 
the sources cited below the texts employ masculine forms. I shall hence give precedence to this 
grammatical form on grounds of faithfulness to the original choice. Altering the original style to 
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[Verse 517]   
(Kappāni viceyya kevalāni,  
saṃsāraṃ dubhayaṃ cutūpapātaṃ,   
Vigatarajam anaṅgaṇaṃ visuddhaṃ  
pattaṃ jātikhayaṃ tam āhu buddhan” ti. Sn 95)9 
 
        The mendicant in whom there is nothing born of anxiety,10  
which is [the very] cause for return to this shore,11  
        Leaves this [as well as] the far shore –  
just like a snake sheds its old worn-out skin. [Verse 15]12   
        (Yassa darathajā na santi keci,  
oraṃ āgamanāya paccayāse,  
so bhikkhu jahāti orapāraṃ   
urago jiṇṇam iva tacaṃ purāṇaṃ. Sn 2)  
 
Avoiding [wrong] views,  
Virtuous, endowed with insight,  
        Having subdued greed for sensual pleasures,  
[The ascetic] will surely never again enter into a womb.13 [Verse 152]   
                                                 
conform to our standards of political correctness is a decision which I respect but personally do not 
feel inclined to follow. I take full blame if this be jarring to other eyes, and offer my sincerest apologies.   
Needless to say, I make no sexist presuppositions, and in my own sentences throughout the paper 
I make sure to use ‘he/she’. Personally, I believe that women can practise the Way and attain Liberation 
in the same way as men can do. To a certain extent, this also appears to be the presupposition 
underlying many Buddhist works. I say ‘to a certain extent’ because sadly, there is an undeniable 
corpus of texts and ideas which discriminates against women. This trend seems to be, however, less 
prominent in the sources connected to ascetics and/or dealing with spiritual praxis and attainments (cf. 
Therīgāthā). The Suttanipāta can also be seen as part of the ascetic strain in Buddhist literature. It is 
therefore conceivable that the authors, redactors, and communities behind such texts would not have 
found objectionable a rendering like ‘him/her – they call “awakened”’, but with no possibility to travel 
back in time and check out with them, I shall stick to the stylistic convention advocated here.       
9 For texts in verse, I give the verse number after the English translation, and the PTS page number 
after the Pali original.  
10 Pali, daratha also means ‘care’ and ‘distress’ (the latter being the translation preferred by Norman 
2001, 2).  
11 ‘This shore’ (ora) is used in the sense of ‘this life’ while the ‘far shore’ (orapāra) refers to the ‘next 
life’.   
12 This last verse is a refrain repeated throughout the entire Uragasutta (Sn verses 1-17).  





(Diṭṭhiñ ca anupagamma  
sīlavā dassanena sampanno 
kāmesu vineyya gedhaṃ,  
na hi jātu gabbhaseyya punar etī ti. Sn 26) 
 
Also going back to the early layers of the Canon,14 the Dhammapada (Words of 
the Teaching)15 likewise refers to saṃsāra as an idea well-known to the audiences to 
which it is addressed.  
 
Through many a birth in the cycle of rebirths have I run, without respite,16  
Seeking the house-maker.17 – Painful is to be born again and again!18  
[Verse 153]  
(anekajātisaṃsāraṃ sandhāvissaṃ anibbisaṃ   
gahakārakaṃ gavesanto, dukkhā jāti punappunaṃ. Dhp 43) 
 
The Dhammapada contains a whole ‘Section on Hell’ (Nirayavagga),19 which makes 
direct references to rebirth in bad (i.e. more often than not, infernal) realms or good 
destinations (gati) according to one’s deeds and views. To give only a few examples,  
  
 
The evil ones, due to their evil deeds, are reborn in hell. [Verse 307cd]  
(pāpā pāpehi kammehi nirayaṃ te upapajjare. Dhp 86)  
 
Adopting erroneous views, living beings go to a bad destination.  
                                                 
come to lie again in the womb’.  
14 See Nakamura 1984, 435; Nakamura 1993, vol. I, p. IV, etc. Von Hinüber 1997 [1997], 45, remarks, 
‘Linguistically, some of the verses seem to be rather old.’   
15 Or Verses of the Teaching, since the padas = ‘words’ conveying the Dhamma are versified. A bolder 
rendering would be Gnomic Verses of Truth, but to all intents and purposes I shall stay as faithful as 
possible. For more on the title, see Norman 1997, XXV.   
16 For anibbisaṃ, I follow Norman’s rendering (1997, 22) convincingly argued for in the endnote to 
the verse (ibid. p. 100). Max Müller (1988 [1881], 42-43) adopts a more straightforward reading: ‘not 
finding him’ [i.e. the maker of the house]. It is also interesting to note Nakamura’s rendering (1978, 
31): 無益 ‘wantonly’ (The author does not give, however, an explanation for his choice).    
17 The traditional commentary (Dhp-a III 128.6-7) glosses gaha, the house, as the individual existence, 
and °kāraka, its maker, as referring to ‘craving’ (taṅhā), qualified as vaḍḍhaki ‘[being like a] ‘carpenter, 
architect, mason’.   
18 Literally, ‘painful is birth again and again’.  
19 For more on the Buddhist notion of hell(s), see Nakamura 1994, vol. II, 737-770.  
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[Verses 316cd, 317cd, 318cd] 
(micchādiṭṭhisamādānā, sattā gacchanti duggatiṃ. Dhp 88-89) 
 
Adopting correct views, living beings go to a good destination. [Verse 319cd]  
(sammādiṭṭhisamādānā, sattā gacchanti suggatiṃ. Dhp 89) 
 
In the Scripture on Tears (Assusutta; SN II 179-180), the Lord proclaims,  
 
‘The cycle of rebirths (saṃsāra), Mendicants, has no fathomable beginning 
(anamatagga).20 No first point in time (koṭi) [can] be discerned [since] the 
sentient beings have been running through and roaming [from one life to 
another] hindered by ignorance (avijjā) and fettered by craving (taṇhā).’  
(anamataggoyaṃ, bhikkhave, saṃsāro. pubbā koṭi na paññāyati 
avijjānīvaraṇānaṃ sattānaṃ taṇhāsaṃyojanānaṃ sandhāvataṃ saṃsarataṃ. 
SN II 179.23-25)21  
   
The stream of tears which we have shed while weeping in this never-ending saga of 
suffering is larger than the four great oceans. Liberation is attained by a profound 
existential experience of disgust with all formations (saṅkhāra) and generating complete 
dispassion towards them.22  
More elaborate depictions of the saṃsāra, probably representing later stages in the 
development of the concept, divide it into five realms. Depending on his/her karma, a 
sentient being is reborn in one of the ‘five destinations (gati) [, to wit, the realms of] hell, 
beasts, hungry ghosts, humans, [or] gods.’ (pañca gatiyo nirayo, tiracchānayoni, 
                                                 
20 Or simply ‘[is] without beginning’, as suggested by Cone 2001, s.v. anamatagga (see also Ch. 
translation below). The exact meaning of the compound anamatagga is difficult to pinpoint. See CPD 
s.v. and PTSD s.v. Rhys Davids and Woodward (1982 [1922], vol. II, 120) translate ‘[i]ncalculable is 
the beginning’ while Bhikkhu Bodhi (2000, 653) renders ‘without discoverable beginning.’  
21 The Chinese version (T 2.240c-241a) does not mention the ignorance and craving. ‘Since the 
beginningless [series of] lives and deaths the sentient beings have been roaming [輪轉 *saṃsāra, 
literally, ‘have been rolling on in circles’] in the long night. No origin [本際, literally, original 
boundary] of the suffering [this cycle entails] is known.’ 衆生無始生死以來長夜輪轉。不知苦之
本際。 (T 2.240c26-27). Also noteworthy is the fact that the Chinese translation does not take 
anamatagga as ‘unfathomable, incalculable’, etc. (if that was in their original Indic text) simply 
referring to the cycle of rebirths as ‘having no beginning’.    
22 Cf. alam eva sabbasaṅkhāresu nibbindituṃ, alaṃ virajjituṃ, alaṃ vimuccitunti. (SN II 180.21-22) 
The Chinese version does not have a direct equivalent of this sentence. Instead it contains a more 
developed passage (T 2.241a9-16) which describes the five aggregates (skandha) as being 





pettivisayo, manussā, devā. DN III 234.7-8).23  
The Scripture on the Divine Messengers (Devadūtasutta; MN III 178-187) presents 
us with an even more elaborate scenario of the afterlife. Not only are we told that those 
whose corporal, verbal, and mental conduct is wrong (kāyaduccaritena samannāgatā 
vacī—pe—manoduccaritena samannāgata […] MN 179.3-4 et passim) are bound to be 
reborn in the evil destinations of hungry ghosts, beasts, and hell. The scripture also offers 
a detailed fresco of infernal torments and regions complete with a storyline of the events 
awaiting wrongdoers in the netherworld. Those who have erred against mothers, fathers, 
recluses, brahmins, or elders of the clan are dragged by hell guardians (nirayapālā) in 
front of King Yama, the supreme judge of good and evil.24  
King Yama cross-examines each sinner about their wrong doings questioning them 
whether they were aware of the right course of action or not. The sinner invariably replies, 
‘Your Honour,25 I was unable [to act according to the moral duties because] I was 
indolent.’ (“nāsakkhissaṃ, bhante, pamādassaṃ, bhante’’ti. MN III 179.28-29 et passim). 
(I wonder whether you could get away by pleading ignorance. With the hell full of lawyers, 
maybe you could get legal advice and manage a plea bargain….) Depending on the 
gravity of the wrong doings, the sinner will suffer horrendous tortures for as long as it 
takes the evil act to consume its karmic charge.26 Vying with a horror movie, the sutta 
continues with shockingly vivid descriptions of infernal tortures, from red-hot iron stakes 
piercing the body and being pared with axes to climbing mounds of burning coals and 
being boiled in red-hot metal cauldrons. (I’ll definitely need legal counsel!)  
The sutta also paints a detailed map of the hell sections, one more colourful than 
the other: the great hell (mahāniraya) (MN III 183-184), the hell of excrement 
(gūthaniraya) (MN III 184-185), the hell of hot embers (kukkuḷaniraya) (MN III 185), 
the forest of simbali-trees (simbalivana)27 (MN III 185), the forest of sword-leaf trees 
(asipattavana) (MN III 185), and the river of caustic water (khārodakā nadī) (MN III 
185). And if sinners mentions being hungry or thirsty, the hell guardians will dutifully 
oblige (literally!) by throwing into their mouths red-hot metal balls or molten copper (MN 
III 185-186). (You know what? I’ll start accumulating merit. And to be on the safe side, 
                                                 
23 See also AN IV 459; etc. In other contexts, such as DN III 264 (asurakāyaṃ uppanno hoti) etc., 
rebirth amongst asura or ‘demigods’ is also mentioned. This will become the base of the alternative 
model of six destinations of rebirth adopted in many later traditions.   
24 tam enaṃ, bhikkhave, nirayapālā nānābāhāsu gahetvā yamassa rañño dassenti – “ayaṃ, deva, 
puriso amatteyyo apetteyyo asāmañño abrāhmañño, na kule jeṭṭhāpacāyī. imassa devo daṇḍaṃ 
paṇetū”ti. (MN III 179.13-16)  
25 Pali bhante usually translates as ‘Venerable Sir’, etc. or when addressing a monk ‘Reverend’, etc. 
but given the court drama setting, ‘Your Honour’ seems more natural here.  
26 na ca tāva kālaṅkaroti yāva na taṃ pāpakammaṃ byantīhoti. (MN III 183.5-6 et passim)  
27 The simbala trees have huge prickles and are burning.  
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also save money for the lawyers in hell….) 
     If we adopt a linear view of history, this elaborate account of the infernal judgement 
and punishment should be regarded as a late development. History, however, does not 
always move along linear trajectories. If the Witzel-Attwood hypothesis should be given 
any credibility, and I think it should, then this ethicised story of hell may well represent 
one of the Iranian elements. Attwood (2012, 55) actually considers this sutta as typically 
‘reminiscent of Zoroastrianism, and even of the Egyptian Book of the Dead’. It is difficult 
to determine a timeframe of the introduction of these Iranian elements into Buddhism. 
They may have slowly trickled in over the centuries through monks of Śākyan ancestry, 
and found a place in the later layers of the Canon. Or likewise plausibly, they may have 
found their way into the Buddhist Dharma through its famous Śākyan founder.  
Many modern students and followers of Buddhism tend to think of Gotama Buddha 
as the Teacher of a purely spiritual path free of mythical elements and superstitions. For 
them, the latter alternative may be quite hard to swallow. There are, however, no a priori 
reasons to rule out this scenario off hand. What we consider now mythical accounts may 
have been seen in Gotama Buddha’s age as ‘scientific’ as our Big Ban theory. Their 
inclusion in the corpus of teachings was, therefore, a legitimate choice. Gotama Buddha 
simply believed them to give an accurate account of a cosmological plane simply as it is 
(yathābhūtam!).  
In the end, it is hard to decide whether such elaborate mythical scenarios (mythical, 
for us!) are early elements or late developments. I do not believe in a uniformly linear 
paradigm of historical change, but in this case I cautiously and tentatively surmise that a 
later date may be more likely. I do not, however, rule out the former possibility. It just 
seems to me (note the impressionistic tone!) that the sutta is representative of a literary 
genre developed by later preachers in order to make the Buddhadharma more accessible 
and more colourful for larger sections of the population. But again, Gotama Buddha may 
have worn a colourful preacher’s hat from the very beginning, hence a much earlier date 
to this afterlife account and the Devadūtasutta.     
What makes things more complicated is the entirely oral nature of scriptural 
transmission in the first centuries of Buddhist history. Gotama Buddha may have sketched 
out an account of hell presided by a King Yama as its supreme judge, but this particular 
account may have found its way into the Canon much later, and in a more developed form, 
after such anthologies of ascetic lore as the Suttanipāta took shape. A more educated 
guess could come only after taking into consideration all the criteria which can be 
convincingly identified as indicative of historical development. And this is something 
which cannot be even remotely attempted here.  
Another aspect which further muddles the picture is that apart from the cultural 
background which may have influenced Gotama Buddha, his own spiritual experiences 
may have played, and most likely did play, a major role in fashioning the doctrine. These 






perspective – seem to have included a ‘direct’ and detailed knowledge of the cycle of 
rebirths. Many canonical accounts consider this saṃsāric cognition as part and parcel of 
Gotama Buddha’s awakening. Not only does he know that his own wandering from one 
life to another has come to an end but he also sees the rebirth destinations of various living 
beings by dint of the divine eye (dibbena cakkhunā), a paranormal faculty acquired by 
strenuous spiritual practice.28  
Similarly, the realisation that rebirth has come to an end is an essential part of the 
stock-phrase describing awakening for an Arhat. ‘[The contemplative comes to] know, 
“destroyed is birth, accomplished pure conduct, done is what was to be done – there is no 
more coming [back] to any existence.”’ (“khīṇā jāti, vusitaṃ brahmacariyaṃ, kataṃ 
karaṇīyaṃ, nāparaṃ itthattāyā”ti pajānāti. MN III 108.22-23)    
 
1.3. Self, no(n)-self, and rebirth29 
The cycle of rebirths is never seen as conflicting to the doctrine of no(n)-self (anattā). To 
deny rebirth entirely would be as incorrect as holding that an eternal soul or self (Pali, 
attan; Skt. ātman) endures unchanged through all the endless wanderings from one life 
to another. For instance, in the Ānanada (SN IV 400-401), also known as the Atthatta (Is 
There a Self?), the Buddha refuses to answer Vacchagota’s questions whether there is a 
self or not (atthattā […] natthattā […]). The reason, the Lord later explains to Ānanda, 
is that an affirmation may have been misconstrued as siding with the eternalists 
(sassatavādā) while a negation may have been misunderstood as taking the same position 
as the annihilationists (ucchedavādā).  
In the Acela or The Naked [Ascetic] (SN II 20-21), the Buddha stresses that he 
                                                 
28 E.g. MN I 23: so evaṃ samāhite citte parisuddhe pariyodāte anaṅgaṇe vigatūpakkilese mudubhūte 
kammaniye ṭhite āneñjappatte sattānaṃ cutūpapātañāṇāya cittaṃ abhininnāmesiṃ. so dibbena 
cakkhunā visuddhena atikkantamānusakena satte passāmi cavamāne upapajjamāne hīne paṇīte 
suvaṇṇe dubbaṇṇe sugate duggate yathākammūpage satte pajānāmi – “ime vata bhonto sattā 
kāyaduccaritena samannāgatā vacīduccaritena samannāgatā manoduccaritena samannāgatā 
ariyānaṃ upavādakā micchādiṭṭhikā micchādiṭṭhikammasamādānā; te kāyassa bhedā paraṃ maraṇā 
apāyaṃ duggatiṃ vinipātaṃ nirayaṃ upapannā. ime vā pana bhonto sattā kāyasucaritena 
samannāgatā vacīsucaritena samannāgatā manosucaritena samannāgatā ariyānaṃ anupavādakā 
sammādiṭṭhikā sammādiṭṭhikammasamādānā; te kāyassa bhedā paraṃ maraṇā sugatiṃ saggaṃ 
lokaṃ upapannā”ti. iti dibbena cakkhunā visuddhena atikkantamānusakena satte passāmi cavamāne 
upapajjamāne hīne paṇīte suvaṇṇe dubbaṇṇe sugate duggate yathākammūpage satte pajānāmi. ayaṃ 
kho me, brāhmaṇa, rattiyā majjhime yāme dutiyā vijjā adhigatā, avijjā vihatā vijjā uppannā, tamo 
vihato āloko uppanno, yathā taṃ appamattassa ātāpino pahitattassa viharato.  
29 Needless to say, this is a central Buddhist doctrine and one of the most hotly debated subjects in 
traditional circles as well as in modern research. Out of the many contributions, I shall only mention 
Nakamura 1993, vol. I, 455-673 (a thorough examination focusing on Early Buddhism).    
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teaches the Dhamma by means of the middle [path] (majjhena Tathāgato dhammam 
deseti) which avoids the extremes of eternalism and annihilationism. This middle path is 
identified as the chain of dependent arising (paṭiccasamuppāda), which at least in a few 
canonical passages is understood as a model of rebirth.30 The same interpretation is also 
found in Buddhaghosa’s Visuddhimagga (Path of Purification) 31  and Vasubandhu’s 
Abhidharmakośabhāṣya (Commentary on the Thesaurus of Scholastics) 32  where the 
chain of dependent arising is construed as stretching over three successive lives.33 More 
on the models explaining the mechanism of rebirth will be said in the next section.   
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  
2. Models: How does it happen?   
 
2.1. Viññāṇa/citta as the agent of rebirth 
Apart from its primary sense of ‘consciousness’ or ‘awareness [of sensation, etc.]’ (e.g. 
SN III 87.17), there are contexts (DN II 63.2-6; MN III 228.25; MN III 260.27; etc.), 
often linked to rebirth, in which the meaning of viññāṇa is what could be more or less 
translated as ‘sentience’.34 ‘[Viññāṇa] is not even sensation in these places, but appears 
to be the centre of a person that transmigrates and eventually finds release’ (Vetter 2000, 
66). It is thus equivalent to citta, satta, puggala, purisa, etc. which are also found with 
the meaning of agent of rebirth (e.g. MN I 501.5).  
One of the most edifying fragments containing such an occurrence of viññāṇa is 
found in the Mahānidānasuttanta or Greater Discourse on Origination:  
 
[The Buddha:] ‘And [if] indeed sentience (viññāṇa) does not descend into the 
mother’s womb, would the mind and body (nāmarūpa) develop in the 
mother’s womb?’   
[Ānanda:] ‘Certainly not, Lord.’  
(“viññāṇañ ca hi, Ānanda, mātukucchismiṃ na okkamissatha, api nu kho 
nāmarūpaṃ mātukucchismiṃ samuccissathā’’ti?  
                                                 
30 See, for instance, MN I 265-267.  
31  According von Hinüber (1997 [1996], 103), the doyen of Pali studies, ‘the brackets for 
Buddhaghosa’s dates are about AD 370 to 450’.   
32 Vasubandhu’s dates are controversial. I have personally argued for dating him c. 350-430 (see 
Deleanu 2006, vol. I, 186-194; Deleanu 2019, 12-13), but other dates such as 320-400 and 400-480 
have also been put forward, with the latter still being the most widely adopted.   
33 See Vism (Warren ed.) ch. XVII §§ 2ff; AKBh ch. III ver. 20. In East Asian Buddhist studies, this 
model is often referred to as ‘three times twofold overlapping’ 三世两重 (Ch. san shi liang chong; 
Jp. san ze ryō jū).  
34 For the meaning of viññāṇa (as well as the other aggregates) in the Pali Canon, see the excellent 






‘‘no hetaṃ, bhante’’. DN II 63.2-6) 
 
   What appears to distinguish viññāṇa/citta from attan or the eternal ‘soul’ is the fact 
that the former is not depicted as an unchangeable, independent entity.35 Although the 
impermanence of viññāṇa may be different from that of the body, its punctuated mode of 
functioning (wakefulness and sleep, etc.) is nothing but a series of moments of grasping 
objects just like a monkey’s faring through the jungle. This can hardly qualify as attan. 
Furthermore, for the Buddhist practitioner, viññāṇa, too, must be viewed with disgust like 
any other aggregate (skandha) (SN II 94-95; also SN II 95-97). Similarly, in the four 
applications of mindfulness (satipaṭṭhāna), citta does not receive any special treatment: 
it must be observed in its ever-changing flux of states, and such an insight will lead to 
complete detachment (DN II 299-300; etc.).36  
 
2.2. A canonical model of rebirth: The Mahātaṇhāsaṅkhayasutta 
In the Mahātaṇhāsaṅkhayasutta or Greater Discourse on the Destruction of Craving (MN 
No. 38),37 three conditions are said to be necessary for the rebirth to take place: the union 
of the mother and father, the mother must be in the proper phase [of her menstrual cycle], 
and the gandhabba must be present [/ready] (paccupaṭṭhito hoti) (MN I 265-266). The 
term gandhabba is explained by Buddhaghosa as ‘the being [about to assume] the form 
[of an embryo in the mother’s womb] (tatrūpakasatto), and paccupaṭṭhito as the process 
in which ‘being [who has just died is] propelled by the mechanism of karma’ 
                                                 
35 According to Nakamura 1981, 157, s.v. 我, the metaphysical ‘Self’ or ‘soul’ upheld by most of the 
Brahmanic and Hindu traditions (but denied by the Buddhists) is qualified by three epithets: 
‘permanent’ 常, ‘one’ [i.e. indivisible] 一, ‘independent’ 主, and ‘lord/master [over oneself]’ 宰. See 
also the definition in the Cheng weishi lun 成唯識論 : ‘Self (*ātman) means “lord [/master] 
(*svāmin)”. Dharma means “[that which] holds (*dhṛ) [its own] norm [/essence]”’ 我謂主宰。法謂
軌持。(T31.1a24). Cf. the epithet svāmī at Paramārthagāthā, 167 (verse 1).  
  There are, however, some passages where the personal viññāṇa may have been construed as being 
absorbed into the great Viññāṇa much in the same vein as the Mahābhārata (12.180. 5-6; vol. III, p. 
2235) which suggests that the fire returns to the ether after its extinction (see Vetter 2000, 67-68, citing 
Frauwallner’s interpretation [in Geschichte der indischen Philosophie, Vol. 1, p. 226]). Even if such a 
view existed in some early Buddhist communities, it never made its way into the mainstream doctrine.  
36 In the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya, all four applications, citta included, must be considered under their 
general characteristics (sāmānyalakṣaṇa). The latter refers to ‘the impermanence of the conditioned 
phenomena, the suffering [brought about by] the contaminants, the emptiness and no(n)-Self of all 
phenomena’ (sāmānyalakṣaṇaṃ tu anityatā saṃskṛtānāṃ, duḥkatā sāsravāṇaṃ, śūnyatānātmate 
sarvadharmāṇām) (AKBh 341.12-13).  
37 Cf. also MN II 156.  
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(kammayantayantito […] satto) into the new form of existence (MN-a II 310, § 12).38 
This triggers the rest of the chain of dependent origination. The next passage details how 
the infant comes in contact with the five strands of sensual pleasures (kāmaguṇa) and 
begins to desire them (MN I 266-267), processes which correspond to the portion 
beginning with the six sense-fields (saḷāyatana) and contact (phassa) links in the chain.  
 
2.3. A scholastic model of rebirth: The Abhidharmakośabhāṣya39 
Vasubandhu describes the mechanism of rebirth in his magnum opus 
Abhidharmakośabhāṣya (Commentary on the Thesaurus of Scholastics), Chapter III, 
verses 4-19 (cum the prose autocommentary).40  
A being in the intermediate existence (antarābhava) or rather in the process of 
moving from one life to another (verse 10) consists of a body of five aggregates (pañca 
skandhāḥ), different from the five aggregates at the moment of death as well as from those 
which he/she will assume in the next rebirth. This being is called gandharva (verse 12c) 
and should not be confused with ātman (verse 18).41 His/her organs are complete. The 
gandharva moves on account of the impetus (vega) of supernatural powers (ṛddhi). 
He/she feeds on odours (gandhabhuk) (verse 14). There are several theories concerning 
the duration of the intermediate state of existence, seven weeks (= 49 days) being only 
one of them (and not necessarily endorsed by Vasubandhu as the correct one).42  
The next major step is when   
         
        The distorted mind heads towards the place of its destiny [animated by]  
lustful desires.  
(viparyastamatir yāti gatideśaṁ riraṁsayā; AKBh, Chapter III, verse 15ab) 
                                                 
38 Cf. McDermott 1983 [1980], 169-170; Ñāṇamoli trans. 1233, note 411.  
  Vasubandhu also refers to this sūtra interpreting gandharva as the special form of existence of the 
sentient beings in the intermediate state (antarābhava) between death and life (AKBh ch. 3 ver. 12c) 
(see next section). Buddhaghosa, on the other hand, conceives the process of rebirth without any 
intermediate state (Vism ch. 17 § 113-114).  
39 Cf. Buddhaghosa’s model (Vism ch. 17 §§ 158-173) which shares quite a few presuppositions and 
elements with AKBh but also contains original features. Relevant sources to the topic include Kritzer 
1999; Abe 2001; Kritzer 2014, etc.  
40 AKBh 114-131. Closely connected to the same topic are verses 20ff. in the same chapter which 
deal with pratītyasamutpāda.  
41 Vasubandhu states, ‘ātman does not exist, only the aggregates [do]’ (nātmāsti skandhamātraṁ). 
The philosopher clarifies in the auto-commentary how he construes ātman: it is an agent of action 
which can abandon and assume new series of skandhas without being karmically determined. Such an 
entity, Vasubandhu argues, does not exit (see AKBh 129).  







As the gandharva is endowed with heavenly eye, i.e. supernatural perception, 
he/she can see the place where his/her future rebirth are no matter how far this may be. 
Three conditions will be necessary for the entrance into the womb:  
 
   [1] The mother is in good health and at the right time [of ovulation].  
[2] The father and mother unite in a sexual act under [the impulse of] lust.  
[3] The gandharva is present there.  
   (matā kalyā ʼpi bhavati ṛtumātī ca. mātāpitarau ratkau bhavataḥ saṃnipatitau 
ca. gandharvaś ca pratyupasthito bhavati. AKBh 121.22-23) 
 
Upon seeing one’s future mother and father united in a sexual act, the gandharvas 
without high spiritual attainments (i.e. the vast majority of the sentient beings) become 
troubled by lust and hostility.43 If the gandharva is gripped by lust towards his future 
mother and feels hostile towards his future father, he will become a male. And the reverse 
is true of a female. (The description is remarkably Freudian.)  
Animated by sexual desire, the gandharva becomes joined to the place where the 
sexual organs of his parents are united. And following the father’s semen and mother’s 
blood (= ovum), the gandharva enters the womb. There,  
 
His [new] aggregates harden, and the aggregates of the intermediate state  
disappear. This is to say that [the being] becomes [re]born.  
(tato ʼsya skandhā ghanībhavanty antarābhavaskandhāś ca antardhīyante, ity 
upapanno bhavati; AKBh 126.24)44  
 
3. Proofs: Corroborating by simile and logic 
  
3.1. Simile-based argumentation: Pāyāsisuttanta 
The Pāyāsisuttanta (DN II 316-358)45 is one of the first canonical sources articulating 
proofs in favour of rebirth and karma.46 The Pali version of the scripture is rather unique 
as its narrative line describes events said to have taken place after the Buddha’s death.47 
                                                 
43 Cf. Ch. 一者、母身是時調適。二者、父母交愛和合。三、健達縛正現在前。(T 29.44c27-29）  
44  In other contexts, this is called the ‘moment of connection [/entry into the womb]’ 
(pratisaṃdhikṣaṇa) (AKBh 124.20).  
45  The Pali scripture corresponds to the Bi su jing 弊宿經  in the Chinese translation of the 
Dīrghāgama 長阿含經 (T 1.42b-47a).  
46 The text seems to belong to the later strata of Canon (see Nakamura 1993, vol. I, 652).   
47 It is Dhammapāla who states that the events described here take place after the Lord’s demise (see 
Malalasekera 1995 [1960], vol. 1, pp. 662-633; cf. Akanuma 1967 [1931], 325-326).   
14
Research Notes on Rebirth in Mainstream Buddhism: Beliefs, Models, and Proofs 
 
 
The protagonist explaining the Buddhist doctrine is Kumāra-Kassapa or Young Kassapa, 
a name most likely chosen to distinguish him from the arch-famous Mahākassapa. But 
Young Kassapa is far from being a small fry in the Saṅgha. He is depicted as one of the 
Buddha’s top disciples known for his learning, wisdom, and eloquence.48 In our text, he 
refutes the wrong views (pāpakaṃ diṭṭhigataṃ) espoused by Prince (rājañña) Pāyāsi who 
professes disbelief in rebirth and the karmic law. The Prince declares,  
 
There is neither any other world, nor are their sentient beings spontaneously 
born,49 nor is there any fruit or result of good or bad deeds.  
(‘‘iti pi natthi paro loko, natthi sattā opapātikā, natthi sukatadukkaṭānaṃ 
kammānaṃ phalaṃ vipāko’’ ti. DN II 316-317)50  
   
This is something which Kumāra-Kassapa cannot accept. Here are the main 
arguments which he adduces in order to refute Prince Pāyāsi and prove the doctrine of 
rebirth and karmic retribution.  
   
(1) The simile of the moon and the sun (candimasūriyaupamā) (DN II 319).51  
Urged to consider the ontological nature of the moon and the sun, Prince Pāyāsi admits 
                                                 
48 DN I 317: “paṇḍito byatto medhāvī bahussuto cittakathī kalyāṇapaṭibhāno vuddho ceva arahā 
cā”ti; Ch. 此童女迦葉有大名聞,已得羅漢。T 42c5. Interestingly, the Chinese translation clearly 
identifies the main preacher as a woman: 童女迦葉 *Kumārī-Kāśyapa.  
On Kumāra-Kassapa, see also AN I 24: aggaṃ […] cittakathikānaṃ yadidaṃ Kumārakassapa (cf. 
Ch.: 能雜種論, 暢悦心識 所謂拘摩羅迦葉比丘是。T 2.558a11-12). Two verses in the Theragāthā 
(201 and 202) are also ascribed to Kumāra-Kassapa (see Malalasekera 1995 [1960], vol. 1, pp. 662-
633).  
49 The ‘spontaneous birth’ expressed by opapātika refers here to the fact that rebirth in another world 
would not require parents, the sine qua non condition in the human and animal worlds. Rhys Davids 
1977 [1959], 349, translates: ‘beings reborn otherwise than from parents’. The Chinese parallel simply 
renders as ‘again born/reborn’ 更生.  
50 Cf. Ch. 弊宿婆羅門 常懷異見, 為人説言: 無有他世, 亦無更生, 無善惡報。(T 1.42c).  
   Let us note that such ‘bad views’ are very similar to those advocated by Ajita Kesakambalī, which 
are cited in the Sāmaññaphalasutta (DN I 55) (for other sources and details, see Malalasekera 1995 
[1960], vol. 1, pp. 37-38; cf. Akanuma 1967 [1931], 13-14). Judging from the account given in this 
text, Ajita Kesakambalī appears to have been an exponent of the naturalist or materialist current 
(lokāyata) of thought. Walshe 1987, 545, note 111, identifies him as ‘materialist’ while Rhys Davids 
1977 [1899], 73, note 1, considers he was ‘a typical sophist’.  
51 I borrow the names of the proofs from the Myanmar version of the Pali Canon (consulted through 
the Chaṭṭha Saṇgāyana Tipiṭaka CD-ROM 4.0.) which gives each respective section a title 






that they are gods, not humans (devā te na manussā). By this, he is obliged to accept the 
possibility of another world, different from this one.52  
(2) The simile of the robber (coraupamā) (DN II 319-322).  
The Prince argues that he has asked dying friends and relatives who had led a sinful life 
to come back and tell him if there is such a place as hell (niraya). But none has come 
back, says Pāyāsi, to bring testimony to its existence. Kassapa counterargues that coming 
out from hell is impossible. Is it possible – he continues – for a robber sentenced to death 
to be set free by his executioners to go home to tell his kinsmen and friends about his 
plight? 
(3) The simile of the cesspool (gūthakūpapurisaupamā) (DN II 322-326)  
Prince Pāyāsi goes on with the opposite example: he has asked those who had led a 
virtuous life to return or dispatch a messenger from the happy destination of the heavenly 
world where they would presumably be reborn (sugatiṃ saggaṃ lokaṃ uppajjissanti). 
Yet, no news of confirming such a realm has ever reached him. To prove the impossibility 
of this ‘empirical’ test, Kassapa makes use of the following simile. Suppose a man falls 
into a cesspool and he would be helped out, thoroughly cleaned from the filth, shampooed 
and anointed, then lavishly adorned and invited to indulge in the pleasures of the five 
senses in a palace. It is inconceivable that such a man would go back and plunge into the 
cesspool. Likewise, to anyone reborn in a heavenly realm, the human world is nothing 
but a cesspool. Returning to it is out of the question.  
(4) The simile of the Thirty-Three Gods (Tāvatiṃsadevaupamā) (DN II 326-327)  
The Prince adduces a similar proof: none of those virtuous enough to be reborn in the 
company of the Thirty-Three Gods, the second of the heavenly worlds in the realm of 
desire (kāmadhātu), has ever returned to bear witness of its existence.53 The reason, 
replies Kassapa, is simple: one day and one night in this heaven amounts to a hundred 
years in the human world. The newly arrived denizens will want to enjoy the place for a 
couple of days before returning to bring the good news. By this time, however, the Prince 
will have been long dead.  
(5) The simile of the person born blind (jaccandhaupamā) (DN II 327-329)  
Prince Pāyāsi does not, however, give up easily: how can you, Kassapa, know that the 
Thirty-three Gods exist and those reborn in their company are so long-lived? This 
knowledge, Kassapa states, is based on the testimony of those ascetics and brahmins 
(samaṇabrāhmaṇā) who have purified their divine eye (dibbaṃ cakkhuṃ visodhenti), a 
supernatural faculty allowing them to see other worlds and the beings reborn there. Just 
as a person blind from birth cannot discern colours or objects is not correct in saying they 
                                                 
52 More on the rationale of this argument will be said in the discussion of Proof I in Section 3.2. below. 
53 On the depictions of this heavenly world in the Pali Canon, see Malalasekera 1995 [1960], vol. 1, 
pp. 1002-1004; cf. Akanuma 1967 [1931], 681-683. For more on the Tāvatiṃsadeva, see Nakamura 
1994, vol. II, 664-677.  
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do not exist, even so an ordinary man like Pāyāsi has no right to deny other worlds only 
because he cannot see them.         
(6) The simile of the pregnant woman (gabbhinīupamā) (DN II 329-332) 
If the afterlife is certain for a virtuous person, Pāyāsi asks, why don’t recluses and 
brahmins commit suicide to reach such places sooner? That would be both foolish and 
selfish, Kassapa retorts. To illustrate his point, the Buddhist monk tells the story of a 
brahmin who had two wives. By one he had a son of ten or twelve, the other was pregnant. 
The brahmin died before his second child was born. The son by his first wife was very 
eager to lay claim to the entire fortune left by his father. That is too early to decide, the 
second wife replied. If her infant is a boy, one portion will be his. But the first son 
wouldn’t listen. He kept repeating his claim, so much so that the pregnant woman rushed 
to open her belly with a sword in order to find out whether she carries a boy or a girl. The 
rash act obviously costs her own life as well as that of her unborn infant. Likewise, 
Kassapa makes clear, it would be unwise for recluses and brahmins to kill themselves 
hastening the ripening of the still unripen (apakkaṃ paripācenti) virtues and attainments. 
Furthermore, by committing suicide they would shirk their responsibility to practise for 
the welfare and happiness of the multitude of living beings, out of compassion for the 
world (bahujanahitāya ca paṭipajjanti bahujanasukhāya lokānukampāya).         
(7) The simile of the dream (supinakaupamā) (DN II 332-334) 
Prince Pāyāsi comes with an empirical argument: I have closely watched the execution 
of robbers, but I have never seen a soul (jīva) leaving the body. How about dreams?, 
counterargues Kassapa. We don’t see the soul entering and leaving one’s body as we 
dream.    
(8) The simile of the heated iron ball (santattaayoguḷaupamā) (DN II 334-335) 
The Prince goes on with another empirical proof against the existence of a soul which 
would be reborn: the body of a robber weighs more after execution than while he was 
alive. (The implication is that one would expect to find the dead body lighter after the 
departure of the soul, itself presumably having a mass). Kassapa likewise rebuts the 
argument with an empirically testable example: an iron ball weighs less when it is heated 
than when it is cool. A living body, with its accompanying factors of life (āyu), heat 
(usmā), and sentience (viññāṇa), does not necessarily entail less mass.  
(9) The simile of the trumpeter (saṅkhadhamaupamā) (DN II 335-338) 
Pāyāsi adduces another argument from his empirical knowledge of executions (and he 
seems to have quite an extensive one): watching how a robber is slowly killed by flaying, 
cutting his flesh, breaking the bones, etc. does not reveal a soul leaving the body. And 
although the sensory organs are left intact, the corpse does not perceive anything. This, 
Kassapa retorts, does not prove anything. It is just like a trumpeter who can produce 
sounds with his conch-shell (saṅkha), but the conch-shell itself does not contain any 
sound in itself. It is the combination of a man, his effort, and the air he blows through the 






basic factors of life, heat, and sentience are present.  
(10) The simile of the matted-hair fire-worshipper (aggikajaṭilaupamā) (DN II 338-
342)  
The Prince’s gruesome record of experimental executions provides him with yet another 
proof: a very minute process of flaying a robber and finely cutting his flesh and bones 
(with a maniac precision, one should add) reveals no place where the soul can be found. 
His eloquent opponent comes up with another simile to illustrate the Buddhist position. 
A fire-worshipper (aggika) with matted-hair, which is the typical mark of an ascetic, asks 
his adopted son to keep the fire while he travels away. If, however, the fire happens to go 
out, no need to worry. The boy can rekindle it. For this, the ascetic gives him an axe, some 
sticks, and fire-sticks. The boy inadvertently lets the fire go out, and then tries to relight 
it by chopping the fire-sticks with the axe. But no matter how fine he chops and pounds 
them, he gets no fire. You, Prince – Kassapa steps up his rebuttal – are as ‘foolish 
[/childish], ignorant, superficial [/incorrect]’ (bālo avyatto ayoniso) as this boy.  
(11) The simile of the two caravan leaders (dve satthavāhaupamā) (DN II 342-347)  
Prince Pāyāsi frankly admits he is unable to provide any further argument, but he won’t 
renounce his opinions even if it were merely out of wrath (kopenapi) and spite 
(paḷāsenapi). He is widely known, after all, for his rejection of rebirth and karma. Sticking 
to bad advice will result in ruin and disaster, admonishes Kassapa. The Buddhist master 
tells him the story of two caravan leaders (dve satthavāhā), each in charge of five hundred 
carts. As they are about to cross a vast stretch of unknown land, a stranger coming from 
the opposite direction advises them to throw away all their provisions of straw, wood, and 
water. There is plenty of grass and water ahead – he assures them, no need to slow down 
and tire your teams. One caravan leader blindly follows the advice, the other wisely keeps 
all the provisions. As the wilderness ahead proves to be arid, the caravan led by the former 
meets with ruin and disaster while the latter safely crosses it. This is what happens to 
those who stubbornly follow bad advice and stick to wrong views.  
(12) The simile of the heap of dry dung (gūthabhārikaupamā) (DN II 347-348)  
The Prince, however, wouldn’t renounce his beliefs. You are, Kassapa tells him, like the 
swineherd who found a heap of dry dung and carried it back on his head to feed his pigs. 
An unseasonable heavy rain splashed the muck over his entire body making him the 
laughing stock of the passers-by. Yet, the swineherd wouldn’t give up the oozing load of 
dung just like you, Prince Pāyāsi, wouldn’t recant your wrong views.  
(13) The simile of the gamblers (akkhadhuttakaupamā) (DN II 348-349) 
But Pāyāsi’s obstinacy is as extreme as his morbid taste for experimental dissections. He 
still won’t admit defeat. Fortunately, Kassapa’s eloquence and narrative talent is out of 
the ordinary. He goes on telling the story of the two gamblers who played akkha, 
apparently a dice game using seeds of the vibhītaka tree.54 One of the gamblers cheated 
                                                 
54 See Rhys Davids 1977 [1959], 368, note 1, citing Lüders’s study ‘Würfelspiel der alten Inder’.  
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by swallowing the extra seeds whenever he got an unlucky dice. The other gambler 
managed to smear over the dice (= seeds) with poison. Blissfully unaware (‘blissfully’ 
for a very brief while…), the swindler continued to swallow the seeds which brought him 
death. Adhering to one’s wrong views is just like swallowing on poisoned seeds in the 
hope of winning a stupid game.          
(14) The simile of the bundle of hemp (sāṇabhārikaupamā) (DN II 349-352)  
Still not enough for the Prince! Kassapa gives one more simile: two friends go around 
looking for something valuable. They first find a pile of hemp, and they both make a 
bundle and carry it away. But then they find hemp-thread. One of the friends throws away 
the hemp, and makes a bundle hemp-thread. The other friend, however, wouldn’t throw 
away his bundle of hemp for a simple reason: he had well tied it up and carried it a long 
way. As the journey progresses, at each new place, they find increasingly valuable things: 
flax, linen-cloth, cotton, iron, copper, tin, silver, and finally gold. One of the friends would 
throw away the previous load and pick up the better one while the other stuck to his bundle 
of hemp. The former obviously ends up a rich man while the latter returns home unable 
to secure happiness for him or his family.  
     The Prince finally gives up (about time!), and declares he had been delighted with 
the master’s argumentation from the very first simile but he wanted to grill Kassapa 
thoroughly (thank the Buddha, not literally!). Not only that Pāyāsi accepts defeat but he 
converts to Buddhism and gladly listens to Kassapa’s instructions.  
 
* 
The dialogue is a systematic attempt to present various arguments to refute a naturalistic 
view and prove rebirth and karma. In spite of the author’s efforts and the well-orchestrated 
admission of defeat by the stubborn Prince, the attempt is rather awkward. Kassapa 
largely relies on similes,55 which in themselves are structurally similar to mechanisms, 
albeit couched in a catchy rhetoric garb. They may (ver-)appeal to the emotions, and thus 
cloud rational judgement, but unless warranted by empirical data or coherent inference 
build from empirically based propositions and/or universally valid axioms, similes have 
little more value than ‘he said, she said’. Similes may be at most plausible models of 
reality until more empirical data is gathered and analysed in order to prove or disprove it.  
Actually, in simile (5), i.e. that of the person born blind (jaccandhaupamā), the 
authors/redactors of the text come dangerously close to admitting the weakness of the 
previous simile. Pāyāsi puts it bluntly: on what authority do you, Kassapa, assert that the 
Thirty-three Gods exist and those reborn in their company are long-lived? The argument 
                                                 
55 The first argument is not strictly speaking a simile. By making appeal to a common set of beliefs 
at that time, i.e. the special ontological status of the moon and the sun as deities (also accepted by the 
Prince), Kassapa proves his point: Pāyāsi is wrong in his statement that there is no other world other 






put forward is, however, ingenious and logically far superior to merely providing similes. 
Kassapa tells the Prince that the basis of his statement is the testimony of those ascetics 
and brahmins (samaṇabrāhmaṇā) who have purified their divine eye (dibbaṃ cakkhuṃ 
visodhenti). Whether we readily accept or not the validity of this testimony, such an 
argumentation has the clear advantage of introducing empirical evidence accepted as 
valid by both parties in the debate.  
Its many logical holes notwithstanding, the Pāyāsisuttanta remains a systematic 
attempt, probably the earliest in the Canon, to come up with an argumentation in favour 
of the existence of rebirth and the law of karma.    
 
3.2. Logic-based argumentation: Jātakamālā 
It will be centuries of philosophical elaborations before Buddhism succeeds in 
formulating a logically sound argumentation in favour of the doctrine of rebirth and karma. 
One of the most articulate models in pre-Dignāga literature comes not from a 
philosopher’s treatise (śāstra) but from the work of a poet. In just seven verses of his 
Jātakamālā, Āryaśūra brilliantly sets forth the gist of the Buddhist proofs in favour of the 
concept of rebirth. Later developments in Buddhist logic and epistemology will add much 
in terms of refinement, but the backbone of the argumentation is similar to the basic points 
made by Āryaśūra. As Namai (1991, 228) points out,  
 
We can say that most of the traditional arguments [in later Buddhist philosophy] 
on this subject [i.e. proof for rebirth] can be traced back to Āryaśūra’s 
description of the Bodhisattva sermon. Accordingly, his argumentations can be 
considered the prototype for the proof of the existence of other lives in the 
Buddhist tradition’.56  
Very little is known about the life and work of Āryaśūra (or simply, Śūra).57 The 
                                                 
56 Apart from this and Steinkellner’s (1984) excellent contribution, we have two superb monographs 
dedicated to the rebirth argumentation in later Buddhist philosophy: Namai 1996 (covering a wide 
range of thinkers) and Franco 1997 (focusing mostly on Dharmakīrti). Traditionally, Dharmakīrti is 
also believed to have authored a commentary: *Jātakamālāṭīkā (see note 58 below). Franco (1997, 
132) is rather sceptical about this attribution but does not rule out the possibility entirely, especially in 
view of the authority of Steinkellner’s (1984, 85 and note 25) acceptance of the traditional authorship. 
(For a very brief overview of Dharmakīrti’s arguments, see Westerhoff 2018, 161-163.) Last but not 
least, mention should also be made of two more sources: (1) the Tibetan edition (’Jig rten pha rol grub 
pa) and outstanding German translation of Dharmottara’s (ca 750-810) Paralokasiddhi (Proof of the 
World Hereafter) from the pen of the doyen of Pramāṇavāda studies, Ernst Steinkellner (1986); (2) a 
very useful discussion in an article-long endnote in Karin Preisendanz’s magnum opus on Nyāya logic 
(1994, vol. II, note 92, pp. 335-348). 
57 For a state-of-the art survey of Āryaśūra’s life and work, see Steiner 2019.  
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Jātakamālā or Garland of Tales of Past Lives, a masterpiece of Buddhist narrative and 
poetic literature, remains the only work which can be attributed with certainty to him.58 
The Tibetan bsTan ’gyur contains five other texts authored by *Āryaśūra (or *Śūra), but 
                                                 
58 The editio princeps of the Jātakamālā was published in 1891 by H. Kern in 1891. It is a reliable 
edition but more textual witnesses discovered over the years as well as our increased knowledge of 
Indic languages and Buddhist literature make a new critical edition a desideratum. This is 
outstandingly satisfied by Hanisch 2005, but unfortunately the book covers only the first 15 tales. 
Meiland 2009 comes close to satisfying this desideratum in his edition, which relies on Hanisch and 
Kern but also includes most of the recent findings in the field. Khoroche 1987 is an indispensable 
companion to the text as it lists many variant readings for all the tales. Hahn 1992, Hahn and Steiner 
1996, Hahn 2001, etc. also bring excellent contributions (variant readings, philological remarks etc.) 
for the edition of individual jātākas. The Jātakamālā is also available in Vaidya’s edition (first 
published in 1959, later issued as a second edition in 1999). The Indian scholar heavily relies on Kern’s 
edition without collating new manuscripts but emends some readings of the editio princeps. The other 
Indian edition, i.e. Chaudharī 2015 [1971], appears to be also based on Vaidya’s work. Rare manuscript 
fragments from Turfan can be consulted thanks to Weller 1955.  
The Jātakamālā was translated into Tibetan by Vidyākarasiṃha and Mañjuśrīvarman as ʼPhags pa 
dpaʼ bo [*Āryaśūra], Skyes paʼi rabs kyi rgyud (P # 5650 [vol. 128; Ke 1b1-152b1] = D # 4150 [Hu 
1b1-135a7). The Tibetan Canon also contains a commentary Skyes pa’i rabs kyi rgya [rgud kyi] cher 
bshad pa (*Jātakamālāṭīkā) attributed to Dharmakīrti (see note 56 above) and translated by 
Janārdhana and Śākya Blo-gros (P # 5651 [Ke 152b2-394a8] = D # 4151 [Hu 135b1-340a7).  
There is also a Chinese version of the text (T 3.331c-385c [T # 160]) ‘translated’ by Shaode 紹徳, 
Huixun 慧詢, et al. under the Song dynasty (therefore, sometime between 10th and 13th centuries). It 
goes by the title of Pusa bensheng man lun 菩薩本生鬘論 or Treatise on the Bodhisattva’s Past 
Lives (*Bodhisattvāvadānamālāśāstra) by ‘*Āryaśūrabodhisattva and others’ 聖勇菩薩等. Both the 
presence of ‘Treatise’ and ‘others’ is rather puzzling. But that may be the least of the problems plaguing 
this version. As Brough 1964 argues, it is a ‘pseudo-translation’. The first part of this cumbersome 
patchwork plagiarises earlier translations (with slight editorial alterations) from the Jātakamālā or 
other texts which contain the tales narrated by the Jātakamālā. Its second part is a muddled text of 
(hardly intelligible) discussions more or less relevant to the tales. The Pusa bensheng man lun does 
not include the Brahmajātaka, where the passage under consideration in this paper occurs (though it 
would most probably have been of little value even if it did.) For more details, see Brough 1964.  
The Jātakamālā has been translated into English several times. We owe the first rendering to 
Speyer in 1895 (see Speyer 1971 [1895]). His translations were edited and published by Musæus-
Higgins in 1914, with the Speyer’s approval (Musæus-Higgins 1914, XIII). We have two very reliable 
English translations: Khoroche 1989 and Meiland 2009. The text was also rendered into English by 
Haskar 2003. For a Hindi translation, see Chaudharī 2015 [1971]. (The translations mentioned above, 
especially Speyer 1971 [1895], Khoroche 1989, and Meiland 2009, have been most helpful, but the 






it is rather improbable or impossible to connect them to Āryaśūra, the Jātakamālā-kāra.59 
The paucity of data regarding his life and work has also influenced the dating of Āryaśūra. 
Since the end of the 19th century, the Buddhist poet has been variously dated from the 2nd 
century to the 7th century.60 The recent decades have seen a growing consensus that the 
most likely date is the 4th century CE.61 Michael Hahn (1993, 37), the top authority in 
the field, concludes: ‘The difference in style between Āryaśūra’s and Haribhaṭṭa’s works 
points to a span of 50 to 100 years lying between them. This would bring down the date 
of Āryaśūra to the middle or even beginning of the fourth century AD.’  
The Jātakamālā does not contain doctrinal elements which could link Āryaśūra to 
any particular Buddhist school.62 It is one of those works which strikes a chord with both 
the Śrāvakayāna and Mahāyāna ‘ailes’. Āryaśūra’s main interest is finding the best 
literary form which could illustrate ethical ideals common to the entire Buddhist tradition. 
This earned the Jātakamālā a special position. ‘It was a work that enjoyed near-canonical 
status among the Northern Buddhists’ (Khoroche 1989, XIV).   
 
* 
The Brahmajātaka or Denizen of the Brahma World, i.e. Tale 29 of the Jātakamālā, 
narrates how Bodhisattva, the future Śākyamuni, converts King Aṅgadinna of Videha 
from his false beliefs which include denial of rebirth and attachment to the enjoyment of 
                                                 
59 See Khoroche 1989, XIII-XIV; Vaidya 1999, IX; Steiner 2019, 70; etc.  
60 The 2nd century has been proposed by scholars like Alsdorf, Tsuji, Machida, etc. (see Namai 1996, 
158, note 1) or admitted as the earliest possible date (Warder 1974, 235; see also note below). On the 
other hand, Kern places the poet between 550 and 650 (see Khoroche 1989, XII). It must be stressed, 
however, that the possibility of an earlier date has considerable weight. For a pertinent discussion, see 
Schmithausen 2020, vol. 2, pp. 235-236 (= note 1537).  
61 See Warder 1974, 235 (placing Āryaśūra in the 4th century but admitting that the date could be 
lowered as early as the second half of the 2nd century); Khoroche 1989, XIII; Saigusa 1987, 22 (dating 
Āryaśūra 3rd to 4th centuries); Hahn 1993, 37; Okada (cited in Namai 1996, 158, note 1); Vaidya 1999, 
IX; placing Āryaśūra between 350-400 AD); Hanisch 2005, XX; Hahn 2007, 8; Meiland 2009, XVIII-
XIX; Steiner 2019, 70; etc. Once again, however, the possibility of an earlier date cannot be ruled out 
(see note 60 above).  
62 See Hahn 1985, 255; Khoroche 1989, XVII-XVII; Hanisch 2005, XIX-XX; Meiland 2009, XX-
XXI; Steiner 2019, 71; etc. It is true that, as noted by Khoroche 1989, XVII-XVIII, the Jātakamālā 
places more emphasis on self-sacrifice than in the Pali Jātakas and there is a mention of the yānavara 
or ‘best vehicle’, which could be an oblique reference to Mahāyāna. But none of these represents a 
‘marked sectarian bias’ (Khoroche 1989, XVIII), let alone a critical attitude towards other traditions. 
(This also warrants the inclusion of the Jātakamālā in this paper which is limited to a survey of the 
concept of rebirth in Mainstream Buddhism.)   
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life here and now.63 The tale begins with a strong admonition:  
 
[Of all] blameworthy [flaws] (avadya) wrong views (mithyādṛṣṭi) are the 
worst.64 This is why particularly those attached to [such pernicious] views  
should be pitied by the virtuous.  
(mithyādṛṣṭiparamāṇy avadyānīti viśeṣenānukampyāḥ satāṁ dṛṣṭivyasana-  
gatāḥ. Jātakamālā 268)65  
 
As a result of his exceptionally arduous practice of meditation (dhyānaviśeṣa°), the 
Bodhisattva has attained rebirth in the celestial spheres of Brahma’s World 
(brahmaloka),66 but feeling pity for the deluded King, he descends to the human realm 
and shows his resplendent appearance before the stunned monarch.  
The main arguments for the existence of rebirth are adduced in verses 7 to 13. They 
are rendered below alongside the preceding dialogue between the Bodhisattva and King 
Aṅgadinna.67  
 
The King said: ‘Does another world (paraloka) really exists?’68  
                                                 
63 The Brahmajātaka contains elements which correspond to the Pali Mahānāradakassapajātaka (Jā 
VI 219ff). The narrative thread of the latter is much more developed, and although it contains a passage 
maintaining that rebirth can be proved, the argumentation follows different lines from the 
Brahmajātaka.   
64 Skt. avadya also means ‘imperfection, vice, censure, disgrace’, etc. (see Monier-Williams 1986 
[1899], s.v.). I take mithyādṛṣṭiparamāṇy as a bahuvrīhi compound literally meaning ‘blameworthy 
[flaws] have wrong views as extreme’.  
65 I follow mainly Meiland’s ed. 2009. The Brahmajātaka found at vol. II, 267-297. This was double-
checked against Khoroche’s list of variae lectiones (1987, 64-66) and collated with Kern ed. 1891, 
192-200 and Vaidya ed. 1999, 200-208. (The punctuation and section titles given below are mine.)   
66 This is the highest of the Buddhist Heavens which comprises no less than 20 spheres, 16 in the 
material realm (rūpadhātu), i.e. inhabited by corporal gods and denizens, and 4 in the immaterial realm 
(arūpadhātu), whose inhabitants are incorporeal. As stated in verse 6 of the Brahmajātaka (p. 272), 
only those beings who have attained stainless virtues (śīla), mastered meditative absorptions (dhyāna), 
and exercise perfect restraint of their senses (indriyasaṃvara) are reborn in one of the spheres of the 
Brahma world (cf. also AN I 227, etc.).  
67 The original of this passage is found at Meiland ed. 2009, vol. II, 272-274. Cf. Kern ed. 1891, 193-
194; Vaidya ed. 1999, 201-202.  
68 Skt. paraloka literally means ‘another world, other world[s]’, often being what we would call 
‘world hereafter’. It refers to the next rebirth whether this happens in the same destination (gati) or 
another. It also includes the world/locus where this rebirth happens as well as a different ontic plane 






The denizen of Brahma’s World [i.e. the Bodhisattva] said: ‘Yes, Your  
Majesty, another world exists.’ 
The King said: ‘But, dear sir, how could I also believe this?’  
The Bodhisattva said: ‘This, Your Majesty, is a plain [truth] which can be  
grasped by reasoning (yukti) [based upon] means of valid cognition (pramāṇa) 
[such as] direct perception (pratyakṣa), etc., [a plain truth in keeping with] the 
method taught by the Trustworthy Persons (āptajana) and ascertainable by 
[following the proper] course of investigation (parīkṣā).69 Consider [these 
points], Sire.’  
(Rājovāca: “kiṁ satyam evedam asti paraloka iti?”   
Brahmovāca: “ām, asti,70 Mahārāja, paralokaḥ.”  
     Rājovāca: “kathaṁ punar idaṁ, mārṣa, śakyam asmābhir api śraddhātuṁ  
syāt?”  
Bodhisattva uvāca: “sthūlam etan, Mahārāja, pratyakṣādipramāṇayukti-  
grāhyam, āptajananidarśitakramaṁ parīkṣākramagamyaṁ ca. paśyatu,  
Bhavān.”)    
  
Proof I, based upon perception (pratyakṣa)  
         ‘The Heaven, with the Moon, the Sun, and stars bedecked, as well as the 
many various beasts –  
This is another world (paraloka) [nonetheless] perceptible [by the sense- 
organs].71 Let not thy mind be benumbed by doubt as to this [fact].’  
                                                 
demonstration of the other world, i.e. Paralokasiddhi (Steinkellner ed. and trans. 1986). (For 
Dharmottara’s dating, I follow Steinkellner and Much 1995, 67.  
69 Skt. parīkṣā also translates as ‘examination’ or ‘test’. The latter is the rendering chosen by Meiland 
2009, vol. II, 273, and Khoroche 1989, 207. Haksar 2003, 206-246, similarly has: ‘can be tested 
through scrutiny’. Speyer 1971 [1895], 271, construes the word as ‘accurate examination’. Speaking 
in the context of early logical discourse in medical literature, Preisendanz (2010, 29) translates parīkṣā 
as ‘examination’ and explains it as literally meaning ‘“viewing from all sides”, i.e., comprehensive 
viewing (pari-√īkṣ)’. More on the parīkṣā will be said below.    
70 I read ām asti following Meiland ed. 2009, vol. II, 272, as well as Vaidya ed. 1999, 201. It is quite 
possible, however, that the original may have been āmāsti, āma being the Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit 
form (see BHSD s.v. āma: ‘yes’). Vaidya ed. 1999, 201, note 3, actually mentions that all Mss read 
‘āmāsti = āma+asti’.   
71 Skt. pratyakṣarūpa literally means ‘in perceptible form’. Cf. Meiland (2009, vol. II, 275): ‘these 
are the next world in its perceptible form’. Skt. pratyakṣa° can also be used as an attribute or predicate, 
in which case it means ‘[directly] perceived’ or ‘perceptible’ (see Schmithausen 1972, 160). In 
composition with °rūpa, here it qualifies paraloka. On °rūpa as a reinforcing quasi-suffix, see 
Schmithausen 2020, vol. 2, p. 444 (= note 2881).  
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[Verse 7]  
(candrārkanakṣatravibhūṣaṇā dyaus, tiryagvikalpāś ca bahuprakārāḥ. |  
pratyakṣarūpaḥ paraloka eṣa. mā te’tra saṁdehajaḍā matir bhūt. ||7||) 
 
Proof II, based upon the testimony of the Trustworthy Ones (āptajana)  
‘And there are now and then those possessing memories of [their former] lives  
due to the practice of meditation and the sharpness of their memory.  
From this, too, the [existence of] another world should be inferred. And am I 
not myself [having come from Brahma’s World] giving evidence of this?’ 
[Verse 8]  
(jātismarāḥ santi ca tatra tatra dhyānābhiyogāt smṛtipāṭavāc ca. |  
ato’pi lokaḥ parato’numeyaḥ. sākṣyaṁ ca nanv atra kṛtaṁ mayaiva? ||8||) 
 
Proof III-a, based upon investigation (parīkṣā)  
‘And [the functioning of] the intellect (buddhi)72 is established only by the  
                                                 
72 Skt. buddhi means ‘intellect, mind, discernment, understanding, judgement, perception, notion, 
idea’, etc. (see Monier-Williams 1986 [1899], s.v.; Wogihara Unrai 1986 [1928-1978], s.v.) In the 
context of our text, buddhi is similarly understood as ‘intellect’ by Meiland (2009, vol. II, 275), 
Khoroche (1989, 207), and Speyer (1971 [1895], 272) (cf. Haksar 2003, 207: ‘intelligence’). The 
precise range of mental functions covered by the term is difficult to pinpoint in spite of the brief 
definition in the next stanza: jñeyāvabodhaṁ ca vadanti buddhiṁ ‘buddhi is said to be cognition 
[/perception?] (avabodha) of the objects [of knowledge]’. This cognition is further qualified as 
‘rudimentary’ or ‘initial’ (ādyā). Roughly speaking, in this context, the term buddhi would therefore 
appear to refer to what we would nowadays call foetal cognitive functions.  
Furthermore, the argument made by this stanza uses buddhi as an equivalent of vijñāna in the sense 
of agent of rebirth (see Section 2.1. above) which requires a preceding moment of vijñāna as an 
immediately contiguous condition (samanantarapratyaya), vijñāna being conceived as an unbroken 
chain of mental events. Although appearing in another context, we actually find buddhi in the sense 
of a moment in the mental/cognitive flow in Buddhist literature (e.g. AKBh 193.19; cf. AKVy 346.29-
33). In Buddhist sources, the word also has the meaning of ‘awakening’, e.g. AKBh 371.13; cf. AKVy 
580.31-32, but this has little relevance here.  
Let us also note that buddhi is one of the objects of valid cognition (prameya) accepted in Nyāya 
philosophy. Its definition is quite broad, amounting to cognition in general. E.g. ‘Intellect, 
comprehension, and knowledge – their meaning is not different’ (buddhiḥ upalabdhir jñānam ity 
anarthāntaram. Nyāyasūtra III.1.15, Vidyābhūṣaṇa ed. 7). See also Nyāyasūtra III.1.17 cited below.  
  If buddhi is a technical term regularly associated with foetal cognitive faculties, one would expect 
to see it used in traditional descriptions of gestation in medical literature. I only looked at the 
Carakasaṃhitā – which is far from enough! – but apart from a couple of remotely resembling 






previous [existence of] intellect. Understand from this, too, that there is a  
another world,  
Because the rudimentary intellect in the womb is the continuation of the  
intellect of the previous life.’ [Verse 9]  
         (yad buddhipūrvaiva ca buddhisiddhir. lokaḥ paro’stīti tato’py avehi. |  
ādyā hi yā garbhagatasya buddhiḥ sānantaraṁ pūrvakajanmabuddheḥ. ||9||) 
 
Proof III-b, based upon investigation (parīkṣā)  
‘And intellect is said to be cognition of the objects [of knowledge]. 
Therefore, there [must] be an object for the intellect at the beginning  
of life [in the womb]. 
                                                 
Development’ (Garbhavikrānti; Carakasaṃhitā vol. I, 428ff.) makes no use of the word buddhi as 
such. The process of rebirth, also covered in this chapter, bears, however, some similarities to the 
Buddhist model albeit with necessary adaptations to the Hinduist orthodoxy. The chapter contains 
numerous references to the soul (ātman) and psychic elements from the earlier life being coalesced 
with the foetus as well as the mental functions developed during gestation. The embryo is said to 
originate from the combination (samudita) of six factors: mother (mātṛ), father (pitṛ), soul (ātman), 
suitability (sāmya), nutrition (rasa), and mind [/psyche] (sattva) (Śārīrasthāna 4.4; vol. I, p. 428). The 
embryo is also described as an aggregation (yukti) of the five great elements (mahābhūta) (i.e. air, 
wind, fire, water, and earth) and consciousness (cetana) (Śārīrasthāna 4.6; vol. I, p. 428). Together 
with the mind (sattva), the element of consciousness (cetanadhātu) is the first one to activate 
(pravartate) once the mother’s ovum and the father’s sperm combine. These two receive all other five 
great elements and stay at the core of their development into the foetus. The element of consciousness 
(cetanadhātu) is qualified by a long list of epithets, such as cause (hetu), doer (kartṛ), etc. One of these 
epithets is ‘knower’ (boddhṛ) (Śārīrasthāna 4.7; vol. I, p. 429), a word obviously cognate with buddhi 
but not particularly helpful in determining its exact semantic range. The only occurrence of the word 
buddhi which I could find in the Carakasaṃhitā with reference to foetal development-cum-rebirth has 
the meaning of ‘intellect’ but used rather differently from our stanzas in the Jātakamālā. The 
Sūtrasthāna 11.11 (Carakasaṃhitā vol. I, 71) raises the possibility that the agent of rebirth is the 
parents’ buddhi which transmigrates to the offspring. The buddhi appears to refer here to adult 
‘intellect’, in this case that of the parents. More importantly, the Carakasaṃhitā denies such a 
possibility, which makes buddhi a poor candidate as a preferred medical term which denotes mental 
faculties associated with the foetal development-cum-rebirth process.   
(By the way, the foetus does display cognitive functions rather early in its development. I do realise 
it might be a tad over-the-top but prompted by evidence-maniac proclivities (anuśaya!), I would 
mention the following study in support of my statement: Aida Salihagic Kadic and Asim Kurjak, 
‘Cognitive Functions of the Fetus’. Ultraschall in der Medizin 39 (2):181-189, 2018 (doi: 10.1055/s-
0043-123469). The scientific findings show that sensory stimuli at cortical level appear from week 25 
of the gestation while foetal action planning is established by week 22, etc.)  
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This [object, however,] does not pertain to this world because [the foetus] has 
no eyes [i.e. visual faculty], etc. Hence, the [cognitive sphere] to which 
[the object necessary] for the arising [of the intellect in the foetal state 
must] pertain to another world [i.e. previous life].’ [Verse 10]   
(jñeyāvabodhaṁ ca vadanti buddhiṁ. janmādibuddher viṣayo’sti tasmāt |  
na caihiko’sau nayanādyabhāvāt. siddhau yadīyas tu paraḥ sa lokaḥ. ||10||) 
 
Proof III-c, based upon investigation (parīkṣā) 
‘It is [often] seen that children and fathers greatly differ in nature (svabhāva), 
and therefore their character (śīla),73 etc. is different.   
Since there is nothing without a cause, it is hence proved that [these differences]  
are based [upon habits] acquired in another life.’ [Verse 11]  
(pitryaṁ svabhāvaṁ vyatiricya dṛṣṭaḥ śīlādibhedaś ca yataḥ prajānām. |  
nākasmikasyāsti ca yat prasiddhir jātyantarābhyāsamayaḥ sa tasmāt. ||11||)  
 
Proof III-d, based upon investigation (parīkṣā)  
‘Although his mental abilities are inferior and the senses are still dull,  
A new-born [child] will strive to suckle without requiring any instruction.’  
[Verse 12]  
(paṭutvahīne’pi matiprabhāve jaḍaprakāreṣv api cendriyeṣu, |  
vinopadeśāt pratipadyate yat prasūtamātraḥ stanapānayatnam. ||12||) 
  
‘This shows that in his previous life he has exerted himself in the practice   
[of gathering] food.  
For [it is only] the perfection of repeated training [that] sharpens whatever skill,  
whether in this or that activity.’ [Verse 13]   
(āhārayogyāsu kṛtaśramatvaṁ tad darśayaty asya bhavāntareṣu. |  
abhyāsasiddhir hi paṭukaroti śikṣāgaṇaṁ karmasu teṣu teṣu ||13||) 
 
* 
We have here a solid argumentation clearly and coherently sustained, complete with a 
statement of its epistemological criteria. It may be not entirely compelling for our modern 
naturalistic paradigms, but to a 5th-century Indian audience, the arguments must have 
                                                 
73 Or ‘virtue, moral behaviour’. Cf. Meiland trans. 2009, vol. 2, 275: ‘In distinction of virtue and other 
factors,/ parents and children clearly differ in nature’. Although ‘virtue’ is a distinct semantic 
possibility especially in a Buddhist text, I prefer to stay with the more general meaning of ‘habit, 
custom, natural or acquired way of living, disposition, character’, etc. (see Monier-Williams 1986 
[1899], s.v.). Cf. Khoroche trans. 1989, 207: ‘behave differently’; Speyer trans. 1971 [1895], 272, 






weighed more heavily. Compared to the long list of similes in the Pāyāsisuttanta, many 
not exactly to the point, Āryaśūra should also be congratulated for his impressive tour de 
force succinctly couched in elegant poetical language.  
     This is not to say that the argumentation is logically and epistemologically water-
tight, even by Buddhist standards. The Pramāṇavāda tradition will bring improvements 
and refinements, but this is another chapter in the Buddhist history. For now, let us take a 
closer look at each point put forth by the text. Then we shall discuss the epistemological 
criteria which form the backbone of the argumentation.  
 
 Proof I, based upon perception (pratyakṣa) 
The fact that Heaven, with the Sun, the Moon, and the stars is a proof ascertainable by 
perception may be rather puzzling for us. It did carry, however, substantial weight for 
most audiences in ancient India. Traditionally, ‘[t]he universe was conceived as of three 
distinct parts—the earth (pṛthvī), the firmament (antarikṣa), and the heavens (dyaus)’ 
(Subbarayappa and Sarma 1985, XX). The Sun is, of course, the most important celestial 
body, followed by the Moon, and the stars (ibid. XX-XXI). They are not only connected 
to the performance of Vedic sacrifices in which Agni functioned as a mediator between 
the celestial and the terrestrial world (Subbarayappa 2008, 69). They themselves are also 
worshipped as deities, the Sun first and foremost.74 So was the Moon75 and the stars 
(nakṣatras), each being associated with a presiding god.76  
As long as one abides by this traditional cosmology, which attributes the firmament 
and the heaven distinct ontological status, divine in nature, he/she is compelled to admit 
the existence of ‘another world’ (paraloka) different from the terrestrial one. And unlike 
a world after death, hidden to our eyes, the Sun, the Moon, and the stars can be seen, 
hence directly ascertained by perception. We have seen the same argumentation in the 
Pāyāsisuttanta, where the sceptic king had to accept it as a valid proof (albeit, he declares, 
insufficient).  
                                                 
74 See Ṛgveda IV,13,2; VII 60,1; VI,62,2; etc. For more examples in Vedic literature as well as 
astronomical texts, see Subbarayappa and Sarma 1985, 28-29. See also Saletore 1984, vol. IV, 1406-
1413.  
75 The Moon was mainly worshipped under the designation of Soma, his (yes, Soma is a masculine a 
deity) divine lineage being spelled out in the Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad (see Saletore 1984, vol. IV, 
1365). Together with the Sun, it is also one of the nine ‘planets’ moving around Mount Meru. For more 
details, see Saletore 1984, vol. IV, 1364-1367.  
76 As Subbarayappa (2008, 69) remarks, nakṣatra has three meanings: (1) star in general, (2) one of 
the 27 equal parts of the zodiac, and (3) a constellation in the zodiac belt. The Vedic literature and 
traditional astronomical literature (e.g. Vedāṅgajyotiṣa) recognises 27 or 28 nakṣatras, each with its 
presiding deity. Subbarayappa 2008, 71-73, offers a meticulously prepared list of the 28 nakṣatras, 
with their different names, presiding deities, etc. in various Vedic and astronomical texts.  
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The second half of the first verse raises more difficulties. One reading, in line with 
the first half of the verse, would be to take tiryagvikalpāś ca bahuprakārāḥ ‘the many 
kinds of various beasts’ as a metaphorical reference to the animal-shaped constellations. 
Several nakṣatras are indeed linked to animal shapes. For instance, Aśvinī is associated 
with a horse head, Mṛgaśīra with a deer head, Mūla with a lion tail, Pūrvāṣādhā with an 
elephant tusk, etc. (see Subbarayappa 2008, 74-75). But not all nakṣatras have animal 
shapes. In the end, only an extensive search through astrological, poetical, etc. sources 
could prove, or disprove, whether comparisons between constellations and animals were 
a common occurrence in Indian literature. Unable to embark upon such a project, I only 
mention this reading as a possible interpretation but not the most likely one.  
 Another interpretation is to construe ‘the many kinds of various beasts’ as a 
straightforward reference to the animal world as a destination of rebirth (gati) distinct 
from the human existence. This would mean that this ‘other world’ of beasts is also staring 
us in the face, being a perceptually ascertainable proof. Actually this is also how the 
*Jātakamālāṭīkā attributed to Dharmakīrti interprets the second half of the verse. For the 
great logician,77 ‘beasts’ (Tib. dud ’gro = Skt. tiryañc) refer to any member of a class 
which shares characteristics similar to elephants, horses, donkeys, camels, birds, insects, 
worms, etc. They constitute a realm different from humans but directly cognisable by 
direct perception.78  
I am rather hesitant to choose this interpretation because the argument seems quite 
weak, if not invalid. For someone not accepting rebirth and its various destinations, this 
amounts to a circular argument. But maybe I have too high expectations as to the degree 
of logical soundness which Āryaśūra was able to secure for his ‘proof’. Though not 
entirely satisfied with this interpretative line either, I have to conclude, also in view of the 
traditional exegesis, that it is more likely than the reading mentioned above.  
 
 Proof II, based upon the testimony of the Trustworthy Persons (āptajana) 
This is more straightforward. It is evidence given by the most advanced adepts who are 
believed to have ascertained the Truth by cognitive means unavailable. This confers 
unquestionable epistemic validity, at least to the followers of the respective tradition.79 
                                                 
77 Supposing that he is the author. See note 56 above.  
78 Tib. dud ’gro brtag pa ni | dud ’gro brtag pa ste | glang po che dang rta dang bong bu <dang?> 
rnga mo || dang bya la sogs pa’i mtshan nyid do || rnam pa mango po zhes bya ni | rigs gcig la rnam 
pa mang po mtha’ yas so || ’di ltar ’bu srin la sogs pa gzhan dag kyang | de bzhin nyid du sbyar te 
| ’dis ni mi’i ’jig rten las gzhan du dud ’gro mngon sum gyis yod pa nyid du ston to || (D Skyes rabs 
Hu 315b6-7 = CD-ROM 9, PDF 23703168, image # 630). I am sincerely grateful to Prof. em. 
Schmithausen for kindly drawing my attention to this commentarial passage.  
79 Interesting to note that only the memories of the spiritual elite seem to count. Semantically, it would 






We shall return to this criterion later, but for now, suffice it to say that although it appeals 
to an act of belief rather than perception or inference, which have universal application, 
i.e. inside as well as outside a particular religious tradition, it should be admitted as a 
cogent argument insomuch as it satisfies the criterion of testimony from the Trustworthy 
Persons, which is clearly adopted by the text as one of its epistemic standards.   
The second half of the second verse – ‘And am I not myself [having come from 
Brahma’s World] giving evidence of this?’ (sākṣyaṁ ca nanv atra kṛtaṁ mayaiva?) –is 
weaker. It only holds true as long as we believe in the veracity of the story. For a 
traditional Buddhist follower, however, this was not a major issue. The jātakas were not 
fiction but reliable accounts of true events. In a traditional setting its validity would not 
have been questioned. In a sense, being part of the corpus of sacred lore, the jātaka tale 
itself can be said to be a type of testimony from the Trustworthy Persons.  
 
 Proof III-a, based upon investigation (parīkṣā) 
The argument rests upon the premise of the continuity of the mental stream not only 
during a lifetime but also from one life to another. This is in tune with the Abhidharma 
scholastics (as well as most other Buddhist traditions) which understands consciousness 
as an uninterrupted series of mental events essentially different from their physical 
support, the body. In a passage arguing in favour of the intermediate state of existence 
(antarābhava), Vasubandhu stresses that only an interrupted mental continuum 
(sattvasantāna)80 can account for the rebirth process and, for that matter, the appearance 
of mental faculties in human beings. 
 
Given [its] similarity to the continuity of rice,81 an interrupted existence [of a 
                                                 
recall their former life/lives. But the compound occurs in the verse which describes the testimony of 
the Trustworthy Persons, therefore invalidating this line of interpretation. The tradition may have been 
aware of regular people recollecting former births, but their testimony cannot constitute a proof based 
on valid knowledge.   
Incidentally, this is quite unlike the empirical approach taken by modern scientists like Stevenson 
(2001), Tucker (2005), Pasricha (2005), etc. who strive to corroborate (or dismiss) claims of memories 
of past lives. It is only those claims which are backed by careful investigation (parīkṣā!) which count 
as scientifically relevant, no matter if they are made by spiritually advanced people or not. More often 
than not they actually come from children too young for any serious spiritual practice.   
80 Occurring at AKBh 120.17 et passim. Interesting to note that Vasubandhu uses here sattva for 
‘mind’, ‘mental’, a term similar to one of the factors in the Carakasaṃhitā description of the 
mechanism of rebirth (for more on the latter, see note 72 above).  
81 Skt. vrīhisantāna ‘continuity of rice’ or ‘continuous series of rice’ may sound strange, but this is 
how the traditional exegete Yaśomitra (AKVy 267.21-24) explains the simile: it is like taking rice from 
on village to another. When the rice reaches its place of destination, you don’t assume that this is new 
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mental stream can]not be generated [as an identical mental stream]. 
(vrīhisantānasādharmyād avicchinnabhavodbhavaḥ |  
AKBh 120.15; Chapter III, verse 11ab)    
 
The rationale behind this is the following. If we suppose that consciousness comes 
to an end entirely at the moment of death, then we cannot account for the rebirth (as well 
as the fruition of the karma seeds still awaiting to manifest themselves). To Vasubandhu, 
a consciousness reproducing itself from zero is an untenable thesis. Therefore, the 
continuity of consciousness becomes a sine qua non requirement for the rebirth process.82 
Furthermore, underlying the argument is the belief that a mental continuum cannot arise 
from non-mental causes. In other words, sensory and mental functions cannot originate 
merely from physiological causes in a new embryo or foetus. At its core, this is a non-
reductionist model of consciousness.  
The same presuppositions run through the argument made in Āryaśūra’s verse. The 
model rules out the possibility of conscious moments without previous similar moments. 
The rudimentary ‘intellect’ (buddhi) in the embryo/foetus necessarily presupposes similar 
mental events which can only be found in a previous life. ‘Understand from this’, says 
Āryaśūra, ‘that there is another world’ (lokaḥ paro’stīti tato’py avehi).  
 
 Proof III-b, based upon investigation (parīkṣā)  
The point Āryaśūra is making here is that the intellect (buddhi), which has been 
established as a sine-qua-non condition for the embryo and foetus, necessarily needs a 
cognitive object for it to function. But in the earliest stages of uterus life, there are no 
properly formed sensory organs which could provide access to cognitive objects. The only 
possibility to account for the functioning of the intellect (which is assumed never to stop) 
is to make appeal to objects perceived in the previous life (most likely its final 
moments).83  
                                                 
rice suddenly emerging there. It is the same rice transported from its place of origin. We are obviously 
dealing with a continuity of the same series of ‘rice-events’, so to speak.  
   One word on the meaning of vrīhi: its semantic range covers ‘grain of rice’, ‘field of rice’, or ‘any 
grain’ (Monier-Williams 1986 [1899], s.v.). It is actually the sense of ‘grain’ which was chosen by the 
Chinese translations (Paramārtha: 穀 ‘grain’; Xuanzang: 穀等 ‘grain, etc.’) as well as the Tibetan 
rendering (’bru, ‘grain’). The original Sanskrit most likely referred, however, to ‘rice’ as vrīhi is a well 
attested food in India also used as an oblation since the Atharvaveda (5,28,6; p. 127).        
82 And since Vasubandhu belongs to a Buddhist tradition which does not accept that the moment of 
the new life can happen immediately contiguous to the moment of death in the previous life (as, for 
instance, the Theravādins believe), he also proves the existence of an intermediary state in between 
two lives in which the mental continuum keeps functioning uninterrupted.  






This argument is derived from the doctrine of the intentionality of the cognitive acts. 
The doctrine is clearly implied in several passages in the early Canon.84 It becomes 
enshrined by the Abhidharma scholastics as a central thesis of the Buddhist epistemology. 
According to it, consciousness is understood as a series of intentional events, i.e. being 
‘about something’ or ‘directed at something’. Let’s take a look at a relevant citation from 
the *Abhidharmavijñānakāyapādaśāstra 阿毘達磨識身足論 , one of the seven 
canonical treatises of the influential Sarvāstivāda school. Traditionally, its author is said 
to be *Devaśarman 提婆設摩. Modern scholarship tends to regard the treatise as a late 
work within the Abhidharmapiṭaka since we often find more elaborate theories and 
methodology compared to what appear to be earlier texts.85 We shall read the passage 
from Xuanzang’s translation玄奘, the only surviving witness.   
 
If you set forth that there are mental acts [/events] (*citta) without [cognitive] 
support [/object] (*ālambana), then it is not possible to say together with the 
sūtras that the World-Honoured One (*Bhagavat) has well spoken,86 well said, 
well expounded [the following:] ‘Mendicants (*bhikṣu), “[it] knows, it knows 
(*vijānāti),”87 therefore it is called consciousness (*vijñāna).88 What does it 
                                                 
84 A close parallel is found at SN III 87.17-22: kiñca, bhikkhave, viññāṇaṃ vadetha? Vijānātīti kho, 
bhikkhave, tasmā viññāṇan ti vuccati. kiñca vijānāti? ambalam pi vijānāti, tittakam pi vijānāti, 
kaṭukam pi vijānāti, madhuram pi vijānāti, khārikam pi vijānāti, akhārikam pi vijānāti, loṇikam pi 
vijānāti, aloṇikam pi vijānāti. vijānātīti kho, bhikkhave, tasmā viññāṇan ti vuccati. Though not exactly 
a close parallel, the following passage in MN I 292.23-28 bears considerable resemblance and in 
essence also says that consciousness needs an object: ‘‘viññāṇaṃ viññāṇan ti, āvuso, vuccati. kittāvatā 
nu kho, āvuso, viññāṇanti vuccatīti?” “vijānāti vijānātīti kho, āvuso, tasmā viññāṇan ti vuccati. kiñca 
vijānāti? sukhanti pi vijānāti, dukkhanti pi vijānāti, adukkhamasukhanti pi vijānāti. vijānāti vijānātīti 
kho, āvuso, tasmā viññāṇan ti vuccatīti.”  
85 See Dhammajoti 2015, 102-105; Watanabe 1986, 1-8 (‘Introductory Explanation’ 解題). The latter 
dates the work about 300-400 years after the Buddha’s demise (ibid. p. 5).  
86 Literally, 不應言謂契經中世尊善語 translates as ‘[you] should not say that “in the sūtras the 
World Honoured One has well spoken […]”’.    
87 Xuanzang’s translation of *vijānāti is了別, a binome literally meaning ‘understand/make clear’ 
and ‘separate’. The first character thus renders the jānāti ‘know’, while the second stresses (one of 
the) semantic value(s) of the suffix vi-, i.e. ‘separation, distinction’. To be more in tune with Chinese 
eyes and ears, the compound should translate as ‘discriminates’. I opted, however, for ‘know’ to stay 
closer to the supposed Indic word which了別 translates here.   
88 Watanabe (1986, 28) translates into classical (kundoku) Japanese as: 苾芻は了別す。了別の故に
名づけて識と為す。‘The bhikṣu knows. Since [he/it] knows, it is called consciousness’, taking thus 
苾芻 bhikṣu (or bhikṣus) as the subject or topical focus of the sentence (‘speaking of a/the bhikṣu(s), 
he…’). I read here in view of the following sentence in the MN I 292.23-28 parallel cited above: 
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know? It knows [= perceives] visible objects (*rūpa), it knows sounds (*śabda), 
odours (*gandha), tastes (*rasa), tangible objects (*spraṣṭavya), and mental 
objects (*dharma).’ If you make such a statement [i.e. cite this canonical proof], 
you do not conform to the [principles of proper] reasoning (*yukti) [i.e. 
contradict your own thesis that there are mental acts without cognitive support].   
Now, if you say together with the sūtras that the World-Honoured One has well 
spoken, well said, well expounded [the following:] ‘Mendicants, “[it] knows, it 
knows,” therefore it is called consciousness. What does it know? It knows 
visible objects, it knows sounds, odours, tastes, tangible objects, and mental 
objects’, you should not say that there are mental acts without [cognitive] 
support [/object]. If you [still] say that there are mental acts without [cognitive] 
support [/object], you do not conform to the [principles of proper] reasoning.  





言有無所縁心, 不應道理。T 26.535a11-18) 
 
Proofs III-c and III-d, based upon investigation (parīkṣā) 
Neither argument seems to presuppose specific Buddhist doctrines. They rely on 
empirical observations. The first (Proof III-c) focuses on the fact that children’s character, 
behavioural patterns, etc. often diverge from their biological inheritance, or as our text 
puts it, from their paternal (pitrya) nature (svabhāva), character (śīla), etc. This must be 
something which has kept people wondering about throughout history. More than in our 
age, such an observation was probably rather puzzling in a traditional society where 
external influences upon a child’s development were much more limited. It is therefore 
tempting to look for reasons other than nature or nurture, particularly in those cases where 
the personality gap is too large. And indeed the argument from rebirth comes in handy.    
The second argument (Proof III-d), similar in its presupposition of habits 
accumulated in an earlier life, adduces such simple skills as suckling displayed by 
neonates without any previous training as evidence for past life experience. Nowadays, 
we attribute this to innate behaviour, and although some of its aspects remain unknown 
or controversial, we link this to a complex interplay of the DNA heritage triggered in 
specific circumstances. For a traditional Buddhist, however, rebirth functioned as a more 
                                                 
vijānāti vijānātīti kho, āvuso, tasmā viññāṇan ti vuccati, which is similarly construed by Bhikkhu 
Ñāṇamoli and Bhikkhu Bodhi, 2005, 388 (cf. also note 431): “‘It cognizes, it cognizes’, friend; that is 






natural explanation.89   
 
 Epistemic criteria  
Let us now turn our attention to the epistemic criteria upon these arguments are 
based. The very fact that Āryaśūra clearly states them before embarking upon his 
argumentation shows a great improvement from the Pāyāsisuttanta. The denizen of the 
Brahma world does not make mere pronouncements. His divine position notwithstanding, 
he tells the sceptic king that the truth of rebirth 
  
can be grasped by reasoning (yukti) [based upon] means of valid cognition  
(pramāṇa) [such as] direct perception (pratyakṣa), etc., [a plain truth in keeping  
with] the method taught by the Trustworthy Persons (āptajana) and  
ascertainable by [following the proper] course of investigation (parīkṣā).  
(pratyakṣādipramāṇayuktigrāhyam, āptajananidarśitakramaṁ parīkṣā- 
kramagamyaṁ ca). 
   
Prima facie, this threefold model looks like a parallel rewording of the three criteria 
of valid cognition advocated in early (pre-Dignāga) Buddhist epistemology, i.e. 
perception (pratyakṣa), testimony given by the Trustworthy Persons (āptajana), and 
inference (anumāna).90 Indeed the Jātakamālā employs identical terms for the first two 
                                                 
89 A similar argument in favour of rebirth (presupposing, however, a lasting soul as its agent) is also 
found at Nyāyasūtra III.1.19 (Vidyābhūṣaṇa ed. 68). I am grateful to Prof. em. Schmithausen for his 
kindly pointing out this parallel.  
It is also interesting to mention in this context that many cases of substantiated claims of memories 
of previous lives display behavioural patterns typical of their former existences (see Stevenson 2001, 
Tucker 2005, Pasricha 2005, etc.). Although simpler behavioural patterns like the new-born’s suckling 
may have nothing to do with former lives (most likely being DNA-based mechanisms), there are some 
exceptional cases of skills for which a former life origin appears to be plausible. I find this research 
fascinating, but I hesitate to commit myself unconditionally to the rebirth hypothesis. I do believe, 
however, that rigorous research into substantiated claims of past lives memories cannot be dismissed 
off-hand as non-sense. This field deserves the full attention of the academic circles as well as the 
general public. We need, however, more data and researchers working from various perspectives and 
methodological frameworks before more certain conclusions can be reached.    
90 As argued by Franco (2010), the earliest attested example in a Buddhist source of a discussion of 
the epistemological criteria of validity is found in the so-called Spitzer manuscript. The text seems to 
date back to the early 3rd CE. In Franco 2005, the author dates the manuscript to 200-230 CE on the 
basis of palaeographical features while in Franco 2010, he argues that the doctrine of comparison, 
referred to in the text, ‘was current at least two centuries before Vātsyāna’ (ibid. 137), whom the 
author dates to the second half of the 5th century (ibid. 136). (We also owe to Franco (2004) an 
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items, but the last one, parīkṣā or ‘investigation’, raises a few problems.  
By and large, parīkṣā would appear to correspond to anumāna or ‘inference’. 
Equating the two terms is, however, far from straightforward. The first criterion cited 
above speaks of pratyakṣādipramāṇa° ‘valid means of cognition [such as] direct 
perception, etc.’. The word ādi ‘etcetera’ usually implies in such contexts anumāna, 
which would make the use of parīkṣā superfluous.  
What further complicates the issue is that Verse 8c (ato’pi lokaḥ parato’numeyaḥ) 
employs anumeya ‘should be inferred/is inferable’, a form obviously connected to 
anumāna. Here what ‘should be inferred’ refers to evidence derived from the memories 
of advanced contemplatives, i.e. Trustworthy Persons. Āryaśūra was therefore fully aware 
of the term but chose to use parīkṣā in a place where one would expect to see anumāna.  
As far as I know (which admittedly is not much), parīkṣā does not seem to be used 
as a synonym or explanatory word for anumāna either in early Buddhist logic or in later 
Pramāṇavāda literature. Of course, we do find parīkṣā in a variety of Buddhist sources 
using the term in its broad sense of ‘investigation, examination’. The Laṅkāvatārasūtra 
(122.9), for instance, urges the practitioner to employ parīkṣā vis-à-vis all phenomena 
(sarvadharma) by means of the famous tetralemma (cātuṣkoṭika). The 
Madhyāntavibhāgabhāṣya (50.8) similarly prescribes the application of parīkṣā to the 
noxiousness (dauṣṭhulya) of the body, a reflective process which leads to the realisation 
of the truth of suffering (duḥkhasatya). A passage in the Laṅkāvatārasūtra (207.13) 
describing Sāṃkhya views employs the compound pravicayaparīkṣā ‘thorough 
investigation’ in connection to dissolution (pralaya) up to the atom (paramāṇu) level. 
The title of Dignāga’s brief but influential work defending the theory of mind-only 
(cittamātra) is Ālambanaparīkṣā or Investigation of the Cognitive Object, parīkṣā being 
used in a general sense of philosophical/reflective examination.91 All 27 chapters in 
                                                 
excellent edition, translation, and introductory study of the Spitzer manuscript.) Another early mention 
of the three criteria is found in the Śrāvakabhūmi, now part of the encyclopaedic Yogācārabhūmi but 
originally compiled as an independent work probably between circa 200-270 (on the formation of the 
text, see Deleanu 2006, 154ff; a reference to three criteria is found at ibid., vol. I, 323: Skt. ed.; vol. 
II, 365-366; Tib. ed.; vol. II, 417: Ch. ed.; vol. II, 449: English translation (see also note 90 on p. 502 
for a brief discussion and bibliographical references). See also Yoshimizu 2010, on logical elements 
in the Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra. The Kośa also makes frequent use of anumāna (AKBh 76.22, 99.2, 
134.17, 193.15, 461.5, 461.10) and pratyakṣa (AKBh 76.22, 102.11, 246.2., 461.5).     
91 Apart from a few citations in Sanskrit (see Tola and Dragonetti 2004, 12), the text has survived 
only in its Tibetan and Chinese translations. We can be sure, however, of the original title thanks to 
the Tibetan translation which as usual gives the title in Sanskrit as well as Tibetan: rgya gar skad du | 
ā laṃ ba na pa rī ksha | bod skad du | dmigs pa brtag pa | (Duckworth et. al. 2016, 218). (The Tibetan 
word translating parīkṣā is brtag pa ‘investigation, examination, enquiry’, etc.) The Tibetan Canon 






Candrakīrti’s Prasannapadā contain °parīkṣā in their titles, e.g. Pratyayaparīkṣā 
‘Examination of Conditions’ (chapter 1, pp. 1ff.), Svabhāvaparīkṣā ‘Examination of the 
Nature [of the Phenomena]’ (chapter 15, pp. 259ff.), Kālaparīkṣā ‘Examination of Time’ 
(chapter 19, pp. 382), Nirvāṇaparīkṣā ‘‘Examination of Nirvāṇa’ (chapter 25, pp. 519ff.), 
etc. Here, too, the term parīkṣā is used in a general (if Madhyamaka-coloured) sense, i.e. 
a thorough (as well as à-la-prasaṅgika-critical) analysis of a topic.92  
As far as I can say, the only use of parīkṣā with a more technical meaning relevant 
to logical contexts comes from Nyāya literature. Though the word is also employed in a 
non-technical sense, parīkṣā came to refer in some contexts not to examining in general 
but rather to a particular type of linguistico-epistemological investigation, i.e. whether a 
definition applies correctly to the object which it is supposed to define, in other words, 
whether the signified matches the signifier. 93  For instance, Vātsyāyana, the earliest 
known exegete of the Nyāyasūtras,94 tells us,   
                                                 
No. 5703; D No. 4205). We have an excellent Tibetan edition of both the root-text (consisting of only 
8 stanzas) and the Vṛitti in Duckworth et. al. 2016, 218-219 and 220-224 respectively (see also Tola 
and Dragonetti 2004, 29-32). The text was translated three times into Chinese by (1) Paramārtha 眞
諦, Si chen lun 思塵論, (2) Xuanzang 玄奘, Guan suoyuan lun 觀所緣論, and (3) Yijing 義淨, 
Guan suoyuan lun 觀所緣論. Yijing also rendered Dharmapāla’s 護法 commentary: Guan suoyuan 
lun shi 觀所緣論釋.All these four texts were translated into Classical Japanese (kundoku style) by 
Ui 1958, 25-69 (with annotations, pp. 71-131). For English translations of the Ālambanaparīkṣā and 
Ālambanaparīkṣāvṛtti, see Duckworth et. al. 2016, 38-39 and 40-47 respectively (the latter also 
collated with the Chinese translations); Tola and Dragonetti 2004, 33-38 (with annotations, pp. 39-51). 
Duckworth et. al. 2016 also contains editions and translations (as well as introductory studies) of the 
Vinītadeva’s Ālambanaparīkṣāṭīkā as well as the most important commentaries by traditional Tibetan 
authors up until the 20th century. In this exegetical literature, the term parīkṣā does not appear to 
receive special attention. It either has no gloss or is understood in its general sense. Cf. Yeshes 
Thabkhas: ‘In general, in this Treatise, Investigation of the Percept, the matters to be investigated 
include: What is the percept? What is its nature? How is a percept conveyed to cognition through a 
representation?’ (English translation in Duckworth et. al. 2016, 176; cf. Tib. ed., ibid., 290).           
92 Also see Prasannapāda 132.12: parīkṣaka; 132.15: parīkṣya; 200.1, 253.13, 362.2: parīkṣyamāṇa; 
448.16: parīkṣita. Incidentally, Tib. translates °parīkṣā = °brtags pa, similar to the Ālambanaparīkṣā 
(see note 91 above) as well as numerous other contexts.    
93 Cf. Nakamura 1983, 120.  
94 Vātsyāyana is dated between 425 and 500 A.D. by Potter (1977, 239; cf. also the discussion of other 
dates). The 5th century is, as far as I know, adopted by many scholars working in the field.   
  Traditionally, the author of the Nyāyasūtras is known as Gautama or Gotama. According to Potter 
1977, 220, ‘it was not until around the 2nd century A.D. that the work took the form in which it now 
appears.’ Various other dates have, however, been suggested, including Oberhammer’s hypothesis that 
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And the method (pravṛtti) 95  of this treatise is threefold: statement 
[/enunciation of a topic] (uddeśa), [its] definition (lakṣaṇa), and [its] 
investigation (parīkṣā) […].96 Investigation is the ascertainment by means of 
the methods of valid cognition whether the defined corresponds or not to [its] 
definition.  
(trividhā cāsya śāstrasya pravṛttiḥ: uddeśo lakṣaṇaṃ parīkṣā ceti. […] 
lakṣitasya yathā lakṣaṇm upapadyate na veti paramāṇair avadhāraṇaṃ 
parīkṣā. Nyāyabhāṣya 11.16-17; 18-19)97  
                                                 
different chapters have different formation, all being compiled together sometime after the 4th century 
(see ibid., 220-221).  
95 Skt. pravṛtti also means ‘activity, efficacity, function; practice application, use’, etc. Pravṛtti or 
‘activity’ is actually one of the objects of valid cognition (prameya) recognised by the Nyāya 
philosophers: ‘activity is [that which] triggers [the functioning of] speech, mind, and body’ (pravṛttiḥ 
vāgbuddhiśārīrāmbha iti; Nyāyasūtra III.1.17, Vidyābhūṣaṇa ed. 8). A more literal rendering of the 
word in the passage above would be ‘the activity [of analysing various topics] in this treatise is 
threefold’. I adopt, however, the freer rendering of ‘method’ which sounds more natural here (and by 
and large refers to the way an ‘activity’ is done). Cf. Iyer 1979, 6, translating as ‘procedure’; 
Preisendanz 1994, vol. II, p. 202, note 23, rendering into German as Vorgehensweise or ‘way of action’.   
96 Iyer 1979, 6, renders these three terms as ‘enumeration’, ‘definition’, and ‘analysis’ respectively. 
Preisendanz (1994, vol. II, p. 202, note 23), one of the leading experts in the field, translates them into 
German as Anführung (‘naming’, ‘referring to’), Kennzeichnung (‘denoting’, ‘labelling’), and 
Überprüfung (‘examining’) respectively. (I hope my English renderings in brackets are close enough. 
German is as subtle and ineffable as Sanskrit.)   
97  Vātsyāyana comments here the famous Nyāyasūtra I.1.3: ‘Perception, inference, comparison 
[/analogy], the word [of Trustworthy Persons, i.e. verbal testimony] are the means of valid cognition’ 
(pratyakṣānumānopamānaśabdāḥ pramāṇāni. (Ruben ed. 2; Vidyābhūṣaṇa ed. 3; Vidyabhushana and 
Vidyaratna ed. 12).  
   A similar definition is found in Keśava Miśra’s Tarkabhāṣā (Iyer ed. 1979, 5.33-34): lakṣitasya 
lakṣaṇm upapadyate na veti vicāraḥ parīkṣā ‘Investigation is the examination whether the defined 
corresponds or not to [its] definition’. (Keśava Miśra is dated by Potter, 1977, 663, around mid-13th 
century.) In his annotation to the passage, Iyer 1979, 6-7, mentions three semantic errors which the 
process of parīkṣā should check and avoid: (1) ativyāpti ‘over-applicability’, which is the over-
stretching of a feature stated by the definition beyond its referential range (e.g. one of the 
characteristics of a bull is having horns (śṛṅgitva), but if we overly extend its application, we will end 
up including all animals having horns in the definition of a bull); (2) avyāpti ‘partial applicability’, 
which refers to including unessential attributes into the definition (like, for instance, choosing the 
colour brown as an essential semantic feature of the definition of ‘bull’, which thus becomes applicable 






    
To return to our Jātakamālā passage, parīkṣā does not appear to have the technical 
meaning we find in the Nyāya treatises. What type of epistemic process is it then? 
Roughly speaking, the core of the parīkṣā-based proofs come under the category of 
inferential judgements (anumāna), but not so neatly as we may expect. Let us first remind 
ourselves what anumāna is, and then see how it applies to Āryaśura’s proofs. For this, 
Mokṣākaragupta’s brief definition in the Tarkabhāṣā comes in handy.98   
 
The explanation of the word anumāna: māna [in anumāna] refers to [the act 
of] a cognitive object being judged [/known] 99  by this [means of valid 
knowledge]; [the prefix] anu [in anumāna] means ‘subsequent’. Anumāna is 
[thus] judgement subsequent [to previous cognitive acts]. The knowledge 
subsequent to grasping the [logical] sign [/probans] (liṅga) and calling to mind 
the connection between the [logical] sign and that possessing the [logical] sign 
[/probandum] (liṅgin), [knowledge] of an object not directly perceived and 
regarding the locus (dharmin), [such as] mountain, etc. – this very [type of 
cognition] is meant by the word anumāna. And this is to be understood 
according to the conventional usage.         
(anumānaśabdanirvacanam: mīyate ’rtho ’neneti mānam. anuḥ paścādarthe. 
paścān mānam anumānam. liṅgagrahaṇaliṅgaliṅgisambandhasmaraṇayoḥ 
paścāt yad vijñānaṃ parvatādau dharmiṇi parokṣavastvālambakaṃ tad 
evānumānaśabdenābhidhīyate. etac ca ruḍhivaśād avagantavyam. Tarkabhāṣā 
17.6-10).100  
                                                 
in the definition (as in saying that bulls have one hoof while in reality they are double-hoofed).  
  The term parīkṣā (as well as verbal forms of pari-√īkṣ) is also used by Vācaspati Miśra II in his 
Nyāyatattvāloka (40.7, 80.6, 138.10). Preisendanz 1994, vol. 1, p. 1, dates Vācaspati Miśra II to circa 
1410-1490.         
98 Mokṣākaragupta is dated by Kajiyama 1966, 6-11, sometime between 1050-1202. The author is 
quite late (actually one of the very last Buddhist logicians on Indian soil), but his treatment of the 
subject follows the ‘orthodox’ lines of Dharmakīrtian system, something he makes clear in the salutary 
verse (Tarkṣabhāṣā 15.3-4). The work is often referred to as a ‘Manual of Buddhist Logic’, but a more 
faithful translation of the title would be Language of Logic or Discourse on Reasoning. For English 
translations, see Kajiyama trans. 1966, Singh ed. and trans. 1988, etc.  
99 Literally, mīyate translates ‘is measured’.  
100 For the sake of reference, here is how Mokṣākaragupta defines perception:  
‘The two types of valid cognition [and] the explanation of the word pratyakṣa:  
This [i.e. the valid knowledge] is twofold, to wit, perception (pratyakṣa) and inference (anumāna). 
Perception is [a tatpuruṣa compound analysed as] ‘depending on [/connected to] (pratigata) an 
organ of sense (akṣa)’. Organ of sense refers to [any of the following] sensory organs (indriya), 
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Like many technical definitions in logic and epistemology, the paragraph above 
sounds more difficult than what it actually means. As often in Indian philosophy and 
clearly hinted at in the passage, the concrete example which Mokṣākaragupta had in mind 
was the inference of fire on a mountain (parvata) from seeing the smoke. To put this in 
his logical jargon, we know that there is fire (liṅgin = probandum, the phenomenon 
possessing/associated with smoke) by seeing smoke (liṅga = probans, the sign of fire) 
and calling to mind our (empirically warranted) cognition of the link between fire and 
smoke. We may not perceive directly the fire, but based on the above cognition, we 
draw the conclusion that the locus (dharmin = the mountain) where the smoke occurs 
is necessarily associated with fire. (Pretty tortuous, isn’t it? I hope firefighters don’t 
spend any time on analysing such syllogisms while on the job.)   
How does this syllogistic formula work in the case of Proof III-c? Intuitively, its 
point is not difficult to grasp: since some behavioural or mental traits cannot be accounted 
for through parental inheritance or education, they must go back to a former life. Thus, 
we know that there is rebirth (liṅgin = probandum) by seeing unaccounted mental 
traits in the present life of an individual as well as by surmising similar traits in a previous 
life of the same individual (liṅga = probans) and calling to mind our (non-empirically 
warranted) cognition of the link between this life and the previous one. Although we 
cannot ascertain directly the previous life, based on the above (half-conjectural) 
cognition, we conclude that the locus (dharmin = the same individual) must be reborn 
(and his/her mental continuum must have preserved the same series of mental events = 
traits in question).      
It does not quite work, does it? I don’t mean only as a watertight proof (at least for 
someone entrenched in a naturalistic paradigm like my hell-bound mental continuum), 
but also from the viewpoint of a logically tight, economically constructed formula. Maybe 
the propositions could be rewritten in simpler terms, but I think the result won’t be as 
simple as the smoke/fire-on-the-mountain syllogism. I wouldn’t not go as far as denying 
the proof a logical structure, but it does contain too many presuppositions and premises 
(which I have underlined), each in need of spelling out.101  
                                                 
i.e. eye (cakṣu), ear (śrotra), nose (ghrāṇa), tongue (jihvā), and body (kāya).(1) Perception is 
considered [to be] the [non-mediated] cognition (jñāna) produced by [any of] these [sense organs].’ 
[…] (pramāṇasya dvaividhyam; pratyakṣaśabdanirvacanam tad dvividhaṃ: pratyakṣam 
anumānaṃ ceti. pratigatam akṣaṃ pratyakṣam. akṣam indriyaṃ 
cakṣuḥśrotraghrāṇajihvākāyākhyam. tasmād utpannaṃ jñānaṃ pratyakṣam abhidhīyate. […] 
Tarkabhāṣā 16.29-32)  
      (1) Literally, ‘sensory organs called (°akhya) eye, […]’.  
101 This may seem to contradict my (cautiously qualified) openness to take into consideration data 






Furthermore, if we turn our attention to the other parīkṣa-based proofs, we see that 
some rest not only on simple observations (= empirically warranted cognition), but also 
on Buddhist doctrines like the idea of mental events requiring previous mental events or 
the intentionality of consciousness. The proofs are not purely inferential (although the 
doctrines themselves may rest on inferential judgement). They combine elements of 
accepting the tradition, inclining thus towards the testimony of the Trustworthy Persons.    
True, most of our inferences are not as simple as the smoke/fire-on-the-mountain 
syllogism. They may be analytically reduced to nuclear syllogisms, but many, if not most, 
would end up being something like the parīkṣa-based proofs, i.e. involving quite a few 
tortuous steps and combining non-empirically warranted elements and presuppositions.   
If Āryaśūra had in mind the neatly structured smoke/fire-on-the-mountain syllogism as 
the one and only formula of anumāna, then he may have preferred another term for more 
complex (clusters of) inferential judgement, also allowing for hybrid elements. This was 
parīkṣa.  
Actually, Āryaśūra may not have been the only one who made such a choice. The 
semantic range of parīkṣā in the Jātakamālā passage seems to be closer to the use of the 
same term in the Carakasaṃhitā, the famous classic of Āyurvedic medicine.102 It comes 
as no surprise that doctors needed to be thorough in their examination (parīkṣā) not only 
of particular symptoms and conditions but also of the methodological criteria upon which 
their correct knowledge and diagnosis depended.  
As Karin Preisendanz (2010, 29-30) remarks in her excellent contribution on the 
                                                 
data is relevant to a naturalist paradigm as long as the behavioural patterns attributed to a former 
existence can be objectively traced and corroborated by evidence (especially if the knowledge of this 
behaviour is otherwise inaccessible to the subject in question). It is not so much the idea that former-
life behaviour can be inherited but rather the way in which we prove and ascertain it.   
102 Like almost any other text in Indian literature, the exact date of the Carakasaṃhitā is not known. 
According to the legend, it was taught by Atreya, codified by his most brilliant disciple Agniveśa, 
enlarged and refined by Caraka (hence the title Carakasaṃhitā or Caraka’s Compendium), and finally 
revised and edited in its present form by the Kashimiri scholar Dṛḍhabala (see Sharma 2001-2003, vol. 
1, V-VI). According to Meulenbeld (1999, vol. 1-A, 114), one of the leading historians of Indian 
medicine, ‘The philosophical material in the Carakasaṃhitā leads inevitably to the conclusion that it 
consists of a mosaic of elements derived from diverse schools of thought, often modified in the service 
of medicine, and mixed with concepts not found elsewhere. The same material suggests that the author 
called Caraka cannot have lived later than about A.D. 150-200 and not much earlier than about 100 
B.C.’ (Meulenbeld discusses in detail Caraka’s identity and date at ibid., 105-115.) As for Dṛḍhabala’s 
revision and redaction, it is surmised to have taken place in the 6th century CE (see Maas 2010). Even 
if the text of the Carakasaṃhitā was not fixed in the form we have today, many, if not most, of its 
ideas and terms must have existed during Āryaśūra’s time (4th century). In one way or another, he may 
have become familiarised with the Carakasaṃhitā, especially its more philosophical parts.   
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emergence of the term nyāya,  
 
[…] the Āyurvedic tradition must have also participated in the epistemological 
discourse of the early classical period (1st to 3rd centuries) by contributing its 
own ideas and have integrated concepts developed by other thinkers belonging 
to the relevant intellectual milieu. The strong Āyurvedic concern with 
examination (parīkṣā) is documented in the Carakasaṃhitā by the several 
different contexts in which examination, its means and its objects are presented 
and in which the act of examination is referred to and enjoined. […] Indeed, 
although examination – in the sense of means of examination – as understood 
in the Carakasaṃhitā is of various types, including especially perception, 
inference, “combination” (yukti) and tradition, and although the act of thorough 
examination has accordingly to be understood as combining various means of 
examination, a strong emphasis on intellectual examination involving inference, 
and possibly, “combination” is implied by the term parīkṣā, other derivations 
of pari-√īkṣ and related formations, and with it the use of reasons.    
 
     Let us ‘examine’ a few occurrences of parīkṣā in the Carakasaṃhitā. The doctor 
should first examine ten types of general factors (etad daśavidham agre parīkṣyaṃ; 
Vimānasthāna ch. 8, § 79; vol. I, p. 370, l. 26), to wit, the agent (kāraṇa), instrument 
(karaṇa), origin of act (kāryayoni), act (kārya), result of the act (kāryaphala), after-effect 
(anubandha), place (deśa), time (kāla), action (pravṛtti), and method (upāya) 
(Vimānasthāna ch. 8, §§ 68-78; vol. I, pp. 369-370). He should then proceed with the 
particular parīkṣā, of which the text says, ‘there are indeed numerous types of 
examination as well as various methods to be examined’ (bahuvidhā hi parīkṣā tathā 
parīkṣyavidhibhedaḥ. Vimānasthāna ch. 8, § 81; vol. I, p. 371, l. 9). The semantic range 
of ‘examination’ does not stop here. A brief statement of its epistemological framework 
tells us that parīkṣā rests upon and can also refer to the means of valid cognition.    
 
Now, for those knowledgeable, 103  there are, however, two types of 
examination:  
perception (pratyakṣa) and inference (anumāna). Indeed, this pair alongside 
instruction (upadeśa)104 should be [considered as the criteria for] examination. 
This examination [can be] thus [classified as] of two types or of three types 
                                                 
103 Skt. jñānavatāṃ ‘for those knowledgeable’ or as Sharma (2001-2003, vol. I, p. 371) renders, ‘those 
who have already acquired (scriptural) knowledge’.  
104 Sharma (2001-2003, vol. I, p. 371) translates upadeśa as ‘authoritative instruction’ which amounts 
to the method taught the Trustworthy Persons (āptajananidarśitakrama) in the Brahmajātaka (as well 






[depending on the] inclusion of instruction.     
        (dvividhā tu khalu parīkṣā jñānavatāṃ: pratyakṣam anumānaṃ ca. etad dhi  
dvayam upadeśaś ca parīkṣā syāt. evam eṣā dvividhā parīkṣā, trividhā vā  
sahopadeśena. Vimānasthāna ch. 8, § 83; vol. I, p. 371, ll. 25-26)        
 
     The full set consists, however, of four criteria of validity, and it is this 
epistemological framework which is often employed by the Carakasaṃhitā.   
 
        Now, the entire [reality can be divided into] just two kinds, [to wit,]  
existent [/real] (sat) and non-existent [/non-real] (asat). Its examination  
(parīkṣā) is of four kinds, i.e. instruction from the Trustworthy Ones  
(āptopadeśa), perception (pratyakṣa), inference (anumāna), and combination  
(yukti).  
(dvividham eva khalu sarvaṃ sac cāsac ca. tasya caturvidhā parīkṣā:  
āptopadeśaḥ, pratyakṣam, anumānaṃ, yuktiś ceti. Sūtrasthāna ch. 11, § 17;  
vol. I, p. 72, ll. 1-2)  
 
The similarity does not end here. We actually find parīkṣā used in a section which 
describes and puts forward arguments in favour of rebirth. After the definition of the four-
criteria set enumerated above, the text continues,  
 
   This and only this105 is the [proper] examination (parīkṣā) by which the entire  
[reality] is examined (parīkṣyate). And upon thus examining by it the existent  
[/real] and the non-existent [/non-real], [it becomes clear that] rebirth  
(punarbhava) exists [/is real].   
(eṣā parīkṣā nāsty anyā yayā sarvaṃ parīkṣyate. parīkṣyaṃ sad asac caivaṃ  
tasyā cāsty punarbhavaḥ. Sūtrasthāna ch. 11, § 26; vol. I, p. 73, l. 1)   
      
     The rebirth is then examined by each of the four criteria set forth above. And guess 
what? A couple of the arguments resemble Āryaśūra’s proofs. Not all, to be sure. The 
philosophical core of the Carakasaṃhitā is Brahmanic, and its main working hypotheses, 
so to speak, reflect the concepts of its orthodoxy. Unsurprisingly, therefore, the Vedas are 
regarded as the fundamental criteria of ‘instruction from the Trustworthy Ones’ 
(Sūtrasthāna ch. 11, § 27; vol. I, p. 73). And the real agent of rebirth is the eternal ātman 
(Sūtrasthāna ch. 11, § 12; vol. I, p. 71).  
     Nonetheless, although couched in a Brahmanic terminology and structured in a way 
different from the Brahmajātaka, some arguments are similar. The argument based on 
perception, for instance, appeals to the direct experience by divine eye (divyacakṣu) of 
                                                 
105 Literally, ‘this is the examination, and there is no other [method]’.  
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the great sages (maharṣi) of yore (Sūtrasthāna ch. 11, § 29; vol. I, p. 73). This comes 
close to Āryaśūra’s adducing the case of contemplatives who remember their former lives 
as evidence for rebirth. (The latter is categorised in the Brahmajātaka as testimony from 
Trustworthy Persons; see Proof II above).   
     Even closer comes the Carakasaṃhitā argument of the discrepancies between 
children and parents. This is adduced as evidence based on perception which observes 
(upalabhyate) that the offspring differ from their mothers and fathers in complexion 
(varṇa), voice (svara), appearance (ākṛti), mind (sattva), intellect (buddhi), and fortune 
(bhāgya) in spite of living in similar conditions (Sūtrasthāna ch. 11, § 30; vol. I, p. 73). 
Though worded differently and qualified as parīkṣā-based, the point made in Verse 11 of 
the Brahmajātaka (Proof III-c above) is pretty similar.  
Was Āryaśūra directly influenced by the Carakasaṃhitā? In the absence of more 
parallels and similarities, it is difficult to draw to a firm conclusion in favour of this 
scenario. The possibility, however, cannot be ruled out, especially as far Āryaśūra’s 
choice of parīkṣā is concerned (as well as hints for some of his proofs?). The Buddhist 
poet may have been familiar with the text or may have come to know about its ideas and 
terminology through other sources.  
Whatever the source of parīkṣā may have been, Āryaśūra probably felt that the 
word does a better job than anumāna. Parīkṣā sounds rigorous enough without having 
the high degree of technical formality of anumāna (especially if the latter was conceived 
in a very narrow sense). Its semantic range as well as usage in similar contexts (like those 
in the Carakasaṃhitā, which he may have known) was broad enough to accommodate 
not only purely inferential propositions but also hybrid judgements. Last but not least, we 
should not forget that Āryaśūra was a poet more than a scholastic (at least in the 
Jātakamālā). His primary aim was reaching out to as many hearts as possible rather than 
nailing it right for an elite of scholarly minds. I couldn’t agree more, and therefore shall 
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AKBh: Abhidharmakośabhāṣya (Pradhan ed.)  
AKVy: Sphuṭārthā Abhidharmakośavyākhyā (Wogihara ed.) 
Ālambanaparīkṣā (Duckworth et al. ed.)  
AN: Aṅguttaranikāya (PTS ed.)  
Atharvaveda (Lubotsky ed.)  
BHSD: Buddhist-Hybrid Sanskrit Grammar and Dictionary, vol. II (Edgerton).  
Carakasaṃhitā (Sharma ed.)  
Ch.: Chinese language/translation  
CPD: A Critical Pāli Dictionary (Trenckner et al. ed.)  
D: Tibetan Canon, sDe dge (Derge) ed. (The Tibetan Buddhist Resources Center)  
Dhp: Dhammapada (PTS ed.)  
DN: Dīghanikāya (PTS ed.)  
Jā: Jātaka (PTS ed.)  
Jātakamālā (Meiland ed.)107  
Jp.: Japanese language/translation  
Laṅkāvatārasūtra (Nanjio ed.)  
Madhyāntavibhāgabhāṣya (Nagao ed.)  
Mahābhārata [Poona ed.]  
MN: Majjhimanikāya (PTS ed.) 
MN-a: Majjhimanikāyāṭṭhakathā (= Papañcasūdanī) (PTS ed.) 
Nyāyabhāṣya (Vidyabhushana and Vidyaratna ed.)   
Nyāyasūtras (Ruben ed.; Vidyābhūṣaṇa ed.; Vidyabhushana and Vidyaratna ed.)   
Nyāyatattvāloka (Preisendanz ed.)  
P: Tibetan Canon, Peking edition  
Paramārthagāthā (Wayman ed.)  
Prasannapadā (la Vallée Poussin ed.)  
PTS: Pali Text Society 
PTSD: The Pali Text Society’s Pali-English Dictionary (Rhys-Davids and Stede ed.)   
Skt.: Sanskrit language/original  
SN: Saṃyuttanikāya (PTS ed.)  
Sn: Suttanipāta (PTS ed.) 
                                                 
・Pali texts: PTS edition volume and page number, occasionally followed by line number after a dot.  
・Sanskrit texts: edition specified in Bibliography, page number, occasionally followed by line number 
after a dot.  
・Chinese texts: Taishō (T) edition of the Canon, volume, page number, segment (a, b, c), occasionally  
followed by column number.  
・Titles of individual suttas/sūtras in the Pali and Chinese Canons have been omitted from the list 
below.  
107 See note 58 above for other editions, too.  
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Sn-a: Suttanipātāṭṭhakathā (= Paramatthajotikā) (PTS ed.)  
ŚrBh: Śrāvakabhūmi (Shukla ed.)  
T: Chinese Canon, Taishō edition  
Tarkabhāṣā [of Keśava Miśra]. (Iyer ed). 
Tarkabhāṣā [of Mokṣākaragupta] (Singh ed.)  
Tib.: Tibetan language/translation  
Triṃśikāvijñaptibhāṣya (Buescher ed.)  
Vin: Vinayapiṭaka (PTS ed.)  
Vism: Visuddhimagga (Warren ed.)  
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